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Incorporating inexpensive low-impact targeted surface charging (plasma) and 
total ionizing dose (radiation) sensors onto national security spacecraft to monitor real-
time environments local to each spacecraft will close a gap in the U.S. space weather 
observation network. Evaluation of the current space weather monitoring architecture 
identified key stakeholders and their needs, as well as a gap in targeted data. This paper 
outlines a solution to improve national security spacecraft anomaly resolution and 
resiliency while decreasing system life-cycle cost. A technical assessment of available 
products found that low-cost, low-impact spacecraft charging and radiation sensors exist 
that meet stakeholder needs. However, upon evaluating the acquisition process, 
weaknesses in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
prevented the stakeholder’s requirements being met. Physical modifications essential for 
the current space weather observation network to meet the stakeholder’s needs were 
identified in an IDEF0 model that represented the functional decomposition for integrated 
and proliferated targeted sensors using ViTech© CORE system architecting software. A 
risk assessment for sensor integration during each phase of the acquisition process 
resulted in a recommendation for national security space enterprise leadership to bypass 
the JCIDS process and require all national security space systems integrate low-impact 
space weather sensors prior to Milestone-C. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVE .....................................4 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................5 
1.  Primary Research Questions ........................................................5 
2.  Secondary Research Questions .....................................................5 
C.  BENEFIT OF STUDY ...............................................................................6 
D.  SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ...................................................................6 
II.  U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACECRAFT—THE HIGH GROUND .......7 
A.  TYPES OF SPACECRAFT ......................................................................7 
1.  Launch Vehicles .............................................................................7 
2.  Communications ............................................................................8 
3.  Positioning Navigation and Timing ..............................................8 
4.  Remote Sensing ..............................................................................9 
B.  SATELLITES: SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ..............................................10 
1.  Space Vehicle Segment ................................................................10 
2.  Ground Segment ..........................................................................16 
C.  CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................18 
III.  SPACE WEATHER AND ITS IMPACTS TO SPACECRAFT .....................21 
A.  THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT .............................................................21 
1.  The Sun .........................................................................................22 
2.  Heliosphere ...................................................................................23 
3.  Magnetosphere .............................................................................24 
4.  Van Allen Radiation Belts ...........................................................25 
5.  South Atlantic Anomaly ..............................................................26 
6.  Ionosphere ....................................................................................28 
B.  AREAS OF OPERATION ......................................................................29 
1.  Low-Earth Orbit ..........................................................................30 
2.  Medium-Earth Orbit ...................................................................31 
3.  Geosynchronous Orbit.................................................................31 
4.  High-Earth Orbit .........................................................................33 
C.  THE SPACE WEATHER ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS...........33 
1.  Neutral Environment ...................................................................35 
2.  Radiation Environment ...............................................................38 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................44 
 viii




1.  Observation Systems ....................................................................48 
2.  Operation Centers ........................................................................52 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................54 
V.  ASSESSMENT OF INEXPENSIVE LOW-IMPACT TARGETED 
SPACE WEATHER SENSORS .........................................................................55 
A.  REQUIREMENTS TO BE LOW IMPACT..........................................55 
B.  EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES ..............................................................56 
1.  Surface Charging Sensors ...........................................................57 
2.  Radiation Sensors.........................................................................58 
C.  BENEFITS OF TARGETED SENSORS ..............................................60 
1.  Lower Life cycle Costs .................................................................61 
2.  Improved Anomaly Resolution and System Resiliency ............63 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................65 
VI.  INTEGRATING TARGETED SENSORS ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
SPACECRAFT .....................................................................................................67 
A.  ACQUISITION CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS ................67 
1.  National Security Space Weather Stakeholder Definition .......70 
2.  Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................71 
B.  LOW-RISK, NO-IMPACT SENSOR INTEGRATION ......................75 
1.  Functional Architecture ..............................................................75 
2.  Physical Architecture ...................................................................78 
3.  Recommendations for Integration..............................................80 
4.  Validation and Verification .........................................................82 
C.  OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATING TARGETED 
SENSORS ON THE SPACECRAFT .....................................................83 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................85 
A.  RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................................86 
1.  Primary Research Questions ......................................................86 
2.  Secondary Research Questions ...................................................88 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK ...............................90 
 ix
APPENDIX. RESPONSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
COMMERCIALLY HOSTED DEMONSTRATION TALKING 
PAPER ..................................................................................................................93 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................99 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES  
  NRO Hexagon System. Source: Center for the Study of National Figure 1.
Reconnaissance (2011). .............................................................................10 
  Basic Spacecraft Subsystems. Source: Nelson and Lenehan (1993, Figure 2.
26). .............................................................................................................11 
  Defense Support Program Control Site. Source: Sellers (2004). ...............17 Figure 3.
  Space Weather Domains. Source: White House Office of Science Figure 4.
and Technology Policy (2013). ..................................................................21 
  Sunspots as Sketched by Richard Carrington of Sunspots on Figure 5.
September 1, 1859. Source: Carlowicz and Lopez (2002, 54). .................23 
  Artist Depiction of the Magnetosphere. Source: ESA and NASA Figure 6.
(2015). ........................................................................................................25 
  New Representation of the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Source: Zell Figure 7.
(2013). ........................................................................................................26 
  South Atlantic Anomaly Proton Radiation Belt. Source: Fortescue, Figure 8.
Swinerd, and Stark (2011, 29). ..................................................................27 
  Electron Density as a Function of Altitude. Source: Olsen (2005, Figure 9.
160). ...........................................................................................................29 
  The Four Main Types of Orbits. Source: Moldwin (2008, 80). .................30 Figure 10.
  Asymmetric Figure-8 Geosynchronous Orbit Ground Track. Source: Figure 11.
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2003). ...........................................32 
  NPT Improvement in Japanese Urban Canyons. Source: Japan Figure 12.
Aerospace Exploration Agency (2003). .....................................................33 
  Number of Satellites Lost in Connection with the March 13–14, Figure 13.
1989, Storm. Source: Space Weather Prediction Center (2015). ...............36 
  Defects in Dielectric Material after Exposure to Electric Field. Figure 14.
Source: Moldwin (2008, 84). .....................................................................37 
  Cartoon Depicting All the Radiation Types that a Spacecraft Can Figure 15.
Experience. Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 2). ...............................38 
 xii
  The Structure of the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Source: Fortescue, Figure 16.
Swinerd, and Stark (2011, 30). ..................................................................39 
  Sunspot Activity. Source: Poppe and Jorden (2006, 25). ..........................40 Figure 17.
  Particle Flux and Particle Energy. Source: MIT OCW (2006). .................41 Figure 18.
  Diagram of Radiation Environment Effects on Electronic Systems. Figure 19.
Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 8). ...................................................42 
  Space Weather Architecture. Source: White House Office of Science Figure 20.
and Technology Policy (2013, 8). ..............................................................48 
  Space Weather Observing Systems. Source: White House Office of Figure 21.
Science and Technology Policy (2013, 13). ..............................................49 
  Geomagnetic Storms. Source: Space Weather Prediction Center Figure 22.
(2015). ........................................................................................................53 
  Solar Radiation Storms. Source: Space Weather Prediction Center Figure 23.
(2015). ........................................................................................................54 
  Radio Blackouts. Source: Space Weather Prediction Center (2015). ........54 Figure 24.
  CPA Diagram. Source: Mazur et al. (2010). ..............................................57 Figure 25.
  CPA Mounted to Spacecraft Panel. Source: Likar (2009). ........................58 Figure 26.
  Teledyne Micro Dosimeter Size Comparison. Source: Teledyne Figure 27.
Microelectronic Technologies (2015) ........................................................60 
  Overview of JCIDS Process and Manual Enclosures. Source: Figure 28.
Goldfein (2015, A-2). ................................................................................69 
  Stakeholder Benefit Relationship ..............................................................72 Figure 29.
  IDEF0 Model for Targeted Space Environment Monitoring. ....................77 Figure 30.
  Space Acquisition Process Overview. Source: The Aerospace Figure 31.
Corporation (2005, 20). ..............................................................................81 
 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1.  Space Environment Hazards. Source: O’Brien et al. (2008, 1). ................34 
Table 2.  Plasma Environment Effects Design Guidelines. Source: Tribble 
(2003, 145). ................................................................................................38 
Table 3.  Listing of Single Event Effects. Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 
13). .............................................................................................................44 
Table 4.  Observing Requirements by Space Weather Domain Space Weather 
Observing Systems. Source: White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (2013, 13)....................................................................47 
Table 5.  Examples of Space Environment Sensors for Operational Vehicles. 
Source: O’Brien et al. (2008, 2). ................................................................51 
Table 6.  AE9/AP9/SPM: Data Sets. Source: Visual Distributed Laboratory 
(2015, 7). ....................................................................................................62 
Table 7.  Stakeholders Defined. ................................................................................70 
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADC analog-to-digital converter 
ADCS  Attitude Determination and Control Subsystem  
AER  Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc. 
AFRL  Air Force Research Laboratory 
AFSPC Air Force Space Command 
AI&T  assembly, integration, and test  
AMPERE  Active Magnetosphere and Planetary Electrodynamics Response 
Experiment 
APL  Applied Physics Laboratory 
AU  astronomical unit  
C&DH  command and data handling  
CDR  critical design review 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CME coronal mass ejection 
CMG  control moment gyros 
COT  commercial-of-the-shelf 
CPA  charge plate assembly  
CPU  central processing unit based  
DMSP  Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DSP Defense Support Program 
ECSS  European Cooperation for Space Standardization 
EMI  electromagnetic interference 
EPS  electrical power system  
ESD  electrostatic discharge  
FFRDC  federally funded research and development centers 
GEO geosynchronous orbit 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
 xvi
HEO high earth orbit; highly elliptical orbit 
HUMINT  Human Intelligence  
HWCI hardware configuration items 
IC intelligence community 
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile  
ICD  initial capabilities document  
IMU  inertial measurement units  
ISS  International Space Station  
JCIDS  joint capabilities integration and development system  
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory LEO low earth orbit 
LRV  last recorded value  
MEO mid-earth orbit 
MIT-LL  MIT Lincoln Laboratory  
MMOD  micrometeoroid/orbital debris 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOPS  National Reconnaissance Office Operations Squadron 
NPT  navigation, pointing, and timing  
NRO  National Reconnaissance Office 
NSF  National Science Foundation  
NTM National Technical Means 
OAM  orbit adjust maneuvers 
OFCM  Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and 
Supporting Research  
PDR  preliminary design review  
PNT positioning navigation and timing 
QZSS  Quasi-Zenith Satellite System 
RE earth radii 
RF  radio-frequencies 
RWA  reaction wheel assemblies  
SAA South Atlantic Anomaly 
 xvii
SBIRS  Space Based Infrared System  
SOC satellite operations center 
SOPS  Space Operation Squadron 
SPO system program office 
SV space vehicle 
SWAP  size, weight and power 
SWPC  Space Weather Prediction Center 
TDRS  Tracking and Data Relay System  
TID  total ionizing dose 
TT&C telemetry, tracking and command 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
  
 xviii




The objective of this thesis is to explore the potential benefits of equipping U.S. 
national security spacecraft with low-impact and inexpensive targeted space environment 
sensors, review the systems engineering and acquisition challenges that exist in executing 
this proposal, and provide recommendations for overcoming these challenges to meet the 
needs of national security space. 
In the earliest days of space exploration, the Soviet’s Sputnik 2 and the United 
States’ Explorer 1 observed the earth’s magnetic field and its trapped charged particles, 
now known as the Van Allen radiation belts. As the number of spacecraft on orbit 
increased, so did the United States’ understanding of space weather and its effects on 
technology. Today, it is understood that “energetic particles and plasma in the space 
environment can be hazardous to space systems, causing system outages, shortening 
mission lifetimes, reducing functional capabilities, and potentially masking hostile 
actions” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 8). Despite these known threats, “the ability to observe, 
predict, and warn of impending solar activity is in its childhood” (Poppe and Jorden 
2006, 1). 
The United States is limited in its ability to understand current environmental 
conditions in space and forecast space weather and its effects partly due to the relatively 
small number of environment sensors currently on orbit. Two classes of sensors are 
employed to track the near-earth space environment: 
(1) Targeted sensors capable of measuring the environment and effects at 
a level sufficient for providing situational awareness for the host 
spacecraft; and (2) Comprehensive sensors capable of providing detailed 
environment measurements that can be mapped to a broad region of near-
Earth space, providing global situational awareness and quantitative 
characterization of the environment. (O’Brien et al. 2008, iii) 
Additionally, due to the lack of space weather situational awareness, determining 
if environmental factors contributed to an on-orbit spacecraft anomaly is “time-
consuming, inaccurate, and of a low confidence level” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 7). Finally, 
U.S. national security is increasingly dependent on the capabilities of space systems. 
 xx
Space is now a recognized domain of warfare (White House 2010, 22). In this 
increasingly contested environment, “real-time, spatially accurate space environment data 
from a targeted sensor is critical to determining whether a specific anomaly event might 
be the result of hostile activity rather than natural phenomena” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 7). 
National security space system development, deployment, and operations would 
benefit greatly from improved space environment situational awareness; however, at this 
time, a comprehensive strategy to improve U.S. capabilities has not been approved. 
Sensor technology is at a readiness level that accommodates multiple targeted sensors 
incorporated onto the spacecraft structure with minimal impact to the host. Currently, 
monitoring the environment around individual spacecraft is rarely a requirement. Without 
a requirement, program managers are not able to invest in this capability despite the 
known benefits. 
To overcome these challenges, a low- to no-cost schedule impact integration plan 
is recommended. This strategy will allow the spacecraft operators to benefit immediately 
from the data provided by targeted spacecraft sensors. Over time, it will improve the 
general understanding of the space radiation and plasma environments over all orbital 
regimes where national security spacecraft operate. This comprehensive amalgamation of 
targeted spacecraft sensors will improve space weather models that influence both space 
weather forecasting and spacecraft design. These immediate and comprehensive 
improvements to the understanding of the space environment will allow space operators 
to respond proactively to space weather threats, differentiate between space weather and 
adversarial impacts, and allow spacecraft designers to engineer spacecraft with more 
accurate margins to survive space weather effects. These benefits ultimately improve 
spacecraft operational availability and space weather monitoring resiliency, and will help 
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The U.S. space program matured from a need to understand the unknown. The 
desire to expand this nation’s reach outside the earth’s atmosphere was not only inspired 
by the desire to explore unknown new worlds or gain familiarity with the little 
understood natural environment outside Earth’s atmosphere, but also was driven more 
from the fear of the unknown residing on the other side of the planet. The former Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had detonated their first atomic weapon in 1949 
and launched their first satellite in 1957. If the Soviets had the ability to launch a radio 
transmitter into orbit over the United States, then they could potentially launch a nuclear 
weapon on a ballistic trajectory to U.S. military targets and population centers, as well as 
this country’s allies. Instantly, the vast oceans on either side of North America that had 
provided some level of isolation and security for almost the last two centuries became 
significantly less protective.  
Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was still fresh in the minds of U.S. 
political and military leadership during the early years of the Cold War. The United 
States was confronted with the conditions for yet another surprise attack, this time 
coming from high above the outer edges of Earth’s atmosphere and over the North Pole 
instead of across the Pacific. The Soviet’s launch of Sputnik displayed advanced 
aerospace technology superior to the American’s, and U.S. national security was 
perceived to be critically at risk. Even more problematic, the United States did not know 
just how far advanced the Soviet technology was over its own technology. Human 
intelligence (HUMINT) had its limitations and overflight of denied Soviet territory to 
gain insight into current activities could possibly result in shooting down an American 
pilot, at best, and at worst, provoke war. The United States needed to kick-start its 
aerospace development programs to contest and counter the Soviet Union’s capabilities 
and gain intelligence on Soviet advancements in development. 
The U.S. Air Force, led by General Curtis E. Lemay, was focused on building 
more and more strategic bomber aircraft to penetrate Soviet borders as a method of 
deployment for nuclear weapons instead of investing in rocket technology and 
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developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The Air Force was also not yet 
interested in overhead reconnaissance. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), intent on 
gaining insight into Soviet military posture and aerospace advances, developed the U-2 
Dragon Lady with Lockheed’s Skunk Works to overfly Soviet territory and gain key 
intelligence. After early program success, both the Navy and the Air Force embraced 
overhead reconnaissance as a means to gain intelligence, and with timely and accurate 
information, they hoped to prevent the war that seemed inevitable. Unfortunately, Soviet 
advances in anti-aircraft missiles allowed for the embarrassing shoot down of Francis 
Gary Powers in a U-2 aircraft over the USSR. Soviet advanced missiles limited the 
capabilities of both strategic bombers and high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. Even the 
CIA’s supersonic and stealthy A-12 Oxcart and the Air Force’s SR-71 were vulnerable 
by the time they became operational. The Sputnik crisis in 1957 followed by the “U-2 
Incident” in 1960 only intensified the pervasive fear of impending nuclear war. The edges 
of the Earth’s atmosphere were vulnerable and the Soviets had the advantage in space; 
the United States needed to invest in the ultimate high ground. 
The president of the United States and Congress prioritized U.S. space 
capabilities by establishing and heavily investing in both civil and military organizations 
whose mission was to push the limits of aerospace technology. Despite trailing Soviet 
capabilities in early years and having to overcome the continuous challenges inherent to 
advanced aerospace activities, the United States’ private and government space industries 
are flourishing today. U.S. national security is no longer dependent on beating the Soviets 
in space; however, assured access and a continuous operational presence in space remains 
pervasively critical to U.S. national security and an average citizen’s current way of life: 
Satellites contribute to increased transparency and stability among 
nations…The utilization of space has created new markets; helped save 
lives by warning us of natural disasters, expediting search and rescue 
operations, and making recovery efforts faster and more effective; made 
agriculture and natural resource management more efficient and 
sustainable; expanded our frontiers; and provided global access to advance 
medicine, weather forecasting, geospatial information, financial 
operations, broadband and other communications, and scores of other 
activities worldwide. (White House 2010b) 
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The national security interests of the United States, military, political, and 
economic, are all increasingly reliant on the capabilities space systems provide. As a 
result, “no other state spends as much on its space activity (75 percent of global space 
funding is by the United States), or has a greater stake in a safe and secure space (43 
percent of all active satellites are U.S. owned)” (Zenko 2014, 6). 
A consequence of U.S. dependence on space-based capabilities is the emergence 
of a constant threat to U.S. national security, the space environment. Today, it is 
understood that “energetic particles and plasma in the space environment can be 
hazardous to space systems, causing system outages, shortening mission lifetimes, 
reducing functional capabilities, and potentially masking hostile actions” (O’Brien et al. 
2008, 1). Despite these known threats, “the ability to observe, predict, and warn of 
impending solar activity is in its childhood” (Poppe and Jorden 2006, 1). 
Partly due to the relatively small number of environment sensors currently on-
orbit, the United States is limited in its ability to understand current environmental 
conditions in space and forecast space weather and its effects. Two classes of sensors are 
employed to track the near-earth space environment:  
(1) Targeted sensors capable of measuring the environment and effects at 
a level sufficient for providing situational awareness for the host 
spacecraft; and (2) Comprehensive sensors capable of providing detailed 
environment measurements that can be mapped to a broad region of near-
Earth space, providing global situational awareness and quantitative 
characterization of the environment. (O’Brien et al. 2008, iii; emphasis 
added) 
Additionally, due to the lack of space weather situational awareness, determining 
if environmental factors contributed to an on-orbit spacecraft anomaly is “time-
consuming, inaccurate, and of a low confidence level” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 7). Finally, 
U.S. national security is increasingly dependent on the capabilities of space systems, and 
space is now a recognized domain of warfare (White House 2010a, 22). In this 
increasingly contested environment, “real-time, spatially accurate space environment data 
from a targeted sensor is critical to determining whether a specific anomaly event might 
be the result of hostile activity rather than natural phenomena” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 7). 
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National security space system development, deployment, and operations would 
benefit greatly from improved space environment situational awareness; however, at this 
time, a comprehensive strategy to improve U.S. capabilities has not been approved. 
Sensor technology is at a readiness level that accommodates multiple targeted sensors 
incorporated onto the spacecraft structure with minimal impact to the host. Currently, 
monitoring the environment around individual spacecraft is rarely a requirement. Without 
a requirement, program managers are not able to invest in this capability despite the 
known benefits. 
Increasing space environment situational awareness does require an investment. 
Traditionally, investment in emerging space capabilities is prioritized to those deemed 
critical to national security. Astronomer and astrophysicist Carl Sagan was acutely aware 
of this paradigm: 
The lesson to me seems clear: there may be no way to send humans to 
Mars [or back to the Moon] in the comparatively near future, despite the 
fact that it is entirely within our technological capability. Governments do 
not spend vast sums just for science, or merely to explore. They need 
another purpose, and it must make real political sense. (Sadeh 2002) 
Significant scientific value can be gained in increased space situational 
awareness; however, pure scientific interests not directly supporting military, economic, 
or political security are not considered during this study. This paper focuses on the 
operational benefits critical to national security space systems realized from increased 
space weather situational awareness. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVE 
The U.S. national security is increasingly dependent on the capabilities of space 
systems. Space weather poses a threat to national security space systems. The United 
States is limited in its ability to counter space weather and its effects. National security 
space system development, deployment, and operations would benefit greatly from 
targeted and local space environment situational awareness around each spacecraft. 
Equipping spacecraft with low-impact and inexpensive space weather sensors may help 
solve this problem. 
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This paper first assesses the current space environmental situational awareness 
capability. Then, it addresses the operational benefits realized from increased space 
weather situational awareness. Finally, it examines and addresses the dimensions of an 
acquisitions strategy, both programmatic and technical, to equip U.S. national security 
spacecraft with low-impact and inexpensive space weather sensors. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research is divided into primary and secondary research questions that are 
addressed throughout each chapter and summarized in the conclusion. The intent of the 
primary questions is to provide decision makers the information required to decide if 
investing in targeted space weather sensors on all national security space satellites is 
worth their consideration and investment. While answering the secondary questions, this 
research will provide the decision makers with a foundational understanding of the 
environmental conditions that affect U.S. spacecraft, what technology exists today that 
supports the U.S. national security interests, and a response to how the proposed 
architecture of proliferated low-impact sensors will advance operations for each 
spacecraft with integrated sensors and the entire national security space enterprise. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
 What are the expected benefits of increased space weather situational 
awareness local to the space vehicle?  
 If the national space community desires those benefits, what are the 
dimensions of an acquisitions strategy, both programmatic and technical, 
that must be addressed? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What is space weather and how does it affect space systems? 
 What are the current operational space weather monitoring capabilities? 
 What technology exists today or in the near future that could provide real-
time local space environment data for individual space vehicles? 
 How can localized sensors contribute to a comprehensive understanding of 
space weather conditions and forecasting? 
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C. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This thesis would benefit the national security space enterprise by defining the 
benefits of localized space vehicle environment situational awareness and laying the 
groundwork for an approach to achieve those benefits. The study examines how low-cost, 
low-impact targeted sensors when combined with data from comprehensive sensors and 
space weather models can significantly increase near earth space environment situational 
awareness.  
The recommendations of this study could also improve operational 
responsiveness to satellite anomalies from space weather effects and adversarial attacks. 
Organizations that could benefit from this study include the Department of Defense 
(DOD), national space programs, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the larger 
government and commercial space community. 
D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
To serve as a foundation for understanding national security space assets, space 
weather, and their interaction, this thesis starts with an overview of the types of satellites 
the United States currently deploys for this nation’s national security. The next chapter is 
a brief overview of the satellite subsystems that can be affected by space weather. The 
following chapter then introduces space environmental physics and the space weather 
architecture that exists today. This thesis then introduces inexpensive low-impact space 
environment sensors that may be integrated into all of today’s national security spacecraft 
and discusses the benefits provided. This integration is not without challenges; this paper 
recommends strategies for overcoming the technical and acquisition challenges of 
integrating low-impact space environment sensors on all national security spacecraft. 
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II. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACECRAFT—THE HIGH 
GROUND 
To serve as a foundation for understanding the benefits and challenges of 
incorporating low-impact targeted space weather sensors on all national security 
satellites, this chapter provides a brief overview of the type of spacecraft critical to U.S. 
national security and their subsystems that can be affected by space weather effects. 
A. TYPES OF SPACECRAFT 
The spacecraft described as follows are currently deployed by the U.S. national 
security space enterprise. Each type of vehicle operates in different orbital regimes and is 
affected by the space weather environment differently relative to their orbits. These 
vehicles are introduced to help the reader understand, at a general level, what vehicles are 
in operations, where they operate, and the next chapter introduces how their environment 
affects them. 
1. Launch Vehicles 
Satellites require a “velocity of at least 18,000 miles per hour to stay in orbit” 
(Nelson and Lenehan 1993, 18). This velocity requires a significant amount of energy to 
propel spacecraft out of the earth’s atmosphere and into a usable orbit. For context, a 
successful launch requires about “400 pounds of rocket propellant to put 10 pounds of 
spacecraft into [Low Earth Orbit] LEO” and “1600 pounds of rocket propellant to put 10 
pounds of spacecraft into [Geosynchronous Orbit] GEO” (18). For a typical launch 
vehicle, the “rocket’s weight is 90% propellant, 10% structure and electronics” (18). 
Many innovative systems have been proposed to place satellites into orbit more 
efficiently, including space elevators that run along carbon fiber nanotubes and electrical 
powered magnetic rail guns; however, rocket powered launch vehicles continue to be the 
only assured vehicles for accessing space. 
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2. Communications 
National security communications satellites provide data links to locations across 
the globe that are impossible or inconvenient to reach by terrestrial systems. Wireless 
communications can be obscured when line of sight between the transmitter and receiver 
is blocked by terrain, such as mountains and natural or urban canyons, or even by the 
curvature of the earth. Terrestrial wired communication is impractical over great 
distances over the oceans or poles, and may be impossible in denied territory. 
Communications satellites can loiter with coverage of most of the earth for a significant 
amount of time. Most communications satellites are in a geosynchronous (GEO) and 
geostationary orbit, about 22,300 miles above the earth’s equator, where they maintain a 
consistent position over the same region of earth. Four or five communication satellites 
dispersed in GEO orbit can provide coverage of almost the entire planet. The polar 
regions are not well covered by GEO satellites. Communications satellites in a highly 
elliptical orbit (HEO) have long dwell times over the poles and can fill this gap.  
In addition to providing direct communications to denied regions on earth, 
communications satellites also provide a link between other spacecraft and the earth, 
especially those flying in low earth orbit (LEO). For spacecraft like the International 
Space Station (ISS) that travel at high rates of speed less than a few hundred miles from 
the surface, it is often inefficient to transmit communications through direct downlink to 
ground antennae. A constellation of communications satellites in GEO or HEO orbits are 
almost always visible from the LEO vehicle and data from that vehicle passed through 
the relay down to a corresponding ground station can provide consistent communications. 
This relayed communications link is often referred to as a “bent pipe.” Spacecraft are 
expensive but constructing, maintaining, and staffing a large number of ground stations to 
support constant contact with LEO vehicles is cost prohibitive. One communications 
relay on orbit can support many different types of other satellites. 
3. Positioning Navigation and Timing 
Perhaps, the most familiar positioning navigation and timing (PNT) satellite 
system currently on orbit is the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS). This 
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system is used worldwide by a very diverse set of users. Other space fairing nations are 
developing competing and complimentary systems, including the European Union 
(Galileo), Russia (GLONASS), China, India, and Japan. These satellites utilize a 
synchronized onboard atomic clock to keep time and transmit their signals back toward 
earth. A user with four satellites in view and a compatible receiver can know their 
coordinate position through triangulation, and then know their exact location in time and 
space. 
This capability is critical to national defense. The DOD uses GPS for naval 
navigation, coordination of troop movements, assistance with friend vs. foe 
determination, and targeting munitions deployment. The DOD, which develops, deploys, 
and maintains the GPS constellation, sustains an additional encrypted message format for 
precise PNT on the GPS constellation. The unencrypted format, however, is still very 
critical to national security as the world’s financial system is reliant on GPS for precise 
timing worldwide. 
4. Remote Sensing 
Remote-sensing satellites are comprised of a wide range of vehicles with a wide 
range of payloads. NASA, NOAA, the DOD and the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO) all fly satellites critical to U.S. national security. NOAA and DOD weather 
satellites help military mission planners determine the best location and time to engage 
the enemy. NRO’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence spacecraft provide 
overhead intelligence products of denied territories. The DOD’s Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) provides constant surveillance of missile launch activity across the 
globe while providing missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and 
battlespace awareness (Chaplain 2014). 
The NRO flies a constellation of satellites often referred to the nations “eyes and 
ears” in space. These remote-sensing satellites, such as the declassified HEXAGON 




 NRO Hexagon System. Source: Center for the Study of National Figure 1. 
Reconnaissance (2011). 
B. SATELLITES: SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
Space systems are true systems of systems comprised of not only the vehicle on 
orbit but also a significant amount of ground components, both hardware and software, 
that support the vehicle. 
1. Space Vehicle Segment 
The space vehicle can be decomposed functionally into lower level functional 
components in a few common ways. For the purposes of this summary, the space vehicle 
subsystems, represented in Figure 2, are decomposed by function into components 
consistent with “The New SMAD” (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 397). 
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 Basic Spacecraft Subsystems. Figure 2. 
Source: Nelson and Lenehan (1993, 26). 
a. Payload 
Payloads are the primary reason the space vehicle is put into orbit. These payloads 
can vary significantly from communications relays to remote sensing payloads. The 
payload and its intended mission often drive the majority of requirements throughout the 
rest of the system. These requirements may determine the orbit of the space vehicle, the 
power required to operate the system, and the pointing accuracy the vehicle must 
maintain to achieve the mission. 
b. Attitude Determination and Control Subsystem 
A space vehicle needs to be able to control its orientation in space. First, one 
requirement may be pointing the payload at a specific reference point. Additionally, the 
communications payload may need to point back to a ground station or a relay satellite, 
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such as the Tracking and Data Relay System (TDRS), to receive commands from mission 
operators or transmit data back for processing. The space vehicle, unless it has a 
thermonuclear power supply (usually reserved for deep space missions), also needs to 
orient its solar arrays toward the sun, none of which can be accomplished without the 
ability to control the vehicle’s three-dimensional orientation. Attitude Determination and 
Control Subsystem (ADCS) systems “include the sensors, actuators, avionics, algorithms, 
software, and ground support equipment used to determine and control the attitude of a 
vehicle” (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 565). 
The vehicle recognizes its attitude in reference to known objects, which is 
accomplished with sensors designed to recognize the earth and the sun, as well as the 
catalog of visible stars. After the spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle, or possibly 
after the satellite experiences an anomaly, the spacecraft must acquire these reference 
points to establish attitude control. Star trackers are a commonly integrated subsystem 
that employs optical sensors and flight software that compares what these sensors see to 
“a star sensor based stellar inertial reference system” (The Aerospace Corporation 2005, 
491), a catalog of known stars, and reorient into a safe configuration where the space 
vehicle is power and thermal stable.  
In addition to these optical sensors, a variant of inertial measurement units (IMU) 
monitors the vehicle’s attitude continuously. The units use accelerometers and 
gyroscopes to track the vehicle’s movements. When the space vehicle knows its location, 
and tracks any changes with the IMU, then it can determine its current attitude in relation 
to its previous known attitude.  
A passive means to maintaining attitude while on orbit is to set the vehicle into a 
spin about a single axis. Like a spinning bicycle tire, the space vehicle remains stable 
while spinning about this axis; however, the agility of the vehicle to slew and point in 
different directions is limited. In this case, the spacecraft mission must allow for a fixed 
payload or the payload must have the ability to point itself. Control moment gyros 
(CMG) or reaction wheel assemblies (RWA) are a more modern approach for attitude 
control. 
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CMGs and RWAs both use spinning rotors to control the vehicle’s attitude. 
CMGs consist of a wheel and one or more gimbals that manipulate the consistently 
spinning wheel, and as a result, its angular momentum generates a torque to maneuver the 
vehicle. RWAs actually manipulate the wheel’s speed to generate a torque. Most 
applications use multiple wheels; at least three are needed to provide three-axis 
stabilization, and more may be incorporated for redundancy. Over time, these CMGs and 
RWAs can build up a significant amount of momentum that needs to be “dumped” from 
the system to operate safely and efficiently. The ADCS system can use magnetic torque 
rods that use an electrical current that creates a magnetic dipole along their length that 
counters the Earth’s magnetic field to remove momentum from the system. This method 
is preferred over using the propulsion subsystem to remove momentum since fuel is in 
limited supply and electricity is renewable. These attitude reference subsystems work in 
combination with the attitude control and propulsion system to orient the vehicle as 
commanded. 
c. Propulsion 
The propulsion system and ADCNS work together to maintain attitude control. 
Typically, thrusters use onboard stored fuel to position and orient the vehicle. Propulsion 
systems contain an energy source and a means to produce thrust. They are used for 
spacecraft orbit adjustments, station keeping maneuvers, collision avoidance, attitude 
control, and removing momentum from onboard attitude control systems like control 
moment gyros, reaction wheels, and magnetic torque rods. The propulsion subsystem 
includes the fuel used to supply energy, the tanks that store that fuel, the plumbing and 
regulatory mechanisms that manipulate the fuel, and the thrusters that expel the energy 
providing thrust. Multiple sources of energy can be used for propellant, including solid 
and liquid fueled thrusters to electronic ion engines. 
d. Command and Data Handling 
Command and data handling (C&DH) is the system responsible for on board 
processing, the storing and sending of payload data, and telemetry through the 
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communications system to the ground segment. This subsystem contains the spacecraft 
computers and flight software responsible for managing all the other subsystems. 
e. Telemetry, Tracking, and Command 
The communications payload and telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) 
subsystems are the “lifeline of the space vehicle” (The Aerospace Corporation 2005, 
541). They are the data link between the ground operators and the vehicle. Radio 
frequencies (RF) are transmitted in the form of commands to the vehicle (uplink), and the 
vehicle responds with vehicle telemetry and mission data through RF back to the ground 
site (downlink). The system may include wideband and narrowband receivers, and 
transmitters, power amplifiers, RF modulators, and the antenna. It does not matter how 
well the payload performs if the vehicle cannot communicate that data back to the 
ground. 
f. Electrical Power System 
The electrical power system (EPS) system is the subsystem that “provides, stores, 
regulates, and distributes electrical power to payloads/instruments, and other flight 
subsystems (i.e., thermal, communication, guidance, and navigation)” (Wertz, Everett, 
and Puschell 2011, 641). The space vehicles typically use a combination of photovoltaic 
solar arrays and batteries to generate and maintain electrical power requirements for the 
system. For maximum efficiency, the space vehicle may adjust its attitude toward the sun 
to increase access to direct sunlight or have moveable arrays that can maneuver toward 
the sun independent of where the vehicle is pointing. The solar arrays can provide a direct 
energy supply to the electrical distribution unit for immediate consumption by other 
subsystems; however, batteries are typically used for power stability and continued 
electrical power while the spacecraft is in an eclipse of the Sun. Design considerations 
need to be made for spacecraft with an orbit that transfers through the Earth’s shadow. 
Enough power budget must exist to transfer through this eclipse and continue its mission 
while the batteries have an opportunity to recharge while in view of the Sun. Battery 
technology has changed over the last several decades, and the space industry is currently 
moving toward space-rated lithium ion cells to store energy. A series of electronics then 
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regulates and controls the power output from the batteries and distributes power to the 
other spacecraft subsystems.  
Nuclear power has been used in space but is usually reserved for interplanetary or 
interstellar missions, as these systems cannot utilize the Sun’s energy efficiently do to 
their ever-increasing distance from the Sun, or they have long duration missions that will 
not re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, such as a Mar’s lander.  
g. Structure, Mechanisms, and Thermal Control 
The spacecraft structure consists of the bus frame, brackets, and fasteners. Weight 
is an important design consideration; honeycomb composites and lightweight aluminum 
structural components are typically used to keep weight to a minimum. This structure 
must support the payload and all other subsystems during the space vehicle’s design life. 
The most stressing environment for space vehicle structures is the launch environment. 
During launch, the vehicle “load cases are typically provided as combination of axial and 
lateral loading” (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 670) where the most violent load 
factors are observed during launch and maximum dynamic pressure (referred to as Max 
Q) when the launch vehicle and space vehicle experience the harshest coupled loads 
environment upon ascent.  
Mechanisms include those moveable elements of the structure that support the 
spacecraft functions that include solar arrays, deployable antennas, and booms, radiators, 
motors, and actuators. These mechanisms have a “relatively high incidence on orbit 
failure” (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 680) and are designed to be as simple as 
possible to reduce the risk of failure.  
All subsystems have requirements for acceptable temperature ranges to function 
properly. The thermal control subsystem manages these temperatures. Several active and 
passive mechanisms are used to maintain these temperature ranges. Protective coatings 
and insulation are used, as well as heat pipes that transfer heat from hot electronics to 
cold areas of the space vehicle in addition to radiators that dispense waste heat into space; 
all help manage the thermal environment. Active electric heaters are used throughout the 
spacecraft to warm mechanisms for deployments and regulate the temperature of 
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electronics. Also, “various military, commercial, and scientific projects require cooling of 
infrared sensors and spectrometers, optical elements, low-noise amplifiers, 
superconducting devices, and other instruments over a range of temperatures from below 
10 K to more than 150 K” (Donabedian 2003, 121). 
2. Ground Segment 
Unlike the Hubble Space Telescope, or the ISS and other previously manned 
orbital space stations that were both designed from the beginning to be serviced and 
resupplied while on orbit, most satellites on orbit will not have an opportunity to be 
repaired, serviced for extended life, or upgraded to improve future mission capabilities. 
The limited ability to perform maintenance on the space vehicle while on orbit requires 
the system be reliable without hands-on intervention, often for many years. For this 
reason, it is prudent to design the vehicle with no more complexity than absolutely 
necessary. Design trades are made early in a satellite system’s development to assess the 
complexity, reliability, and associated risks between the space and ground segments.  
The “European Cooperation for Space Standardization (ECSS) [defines the 
ground segment] as composed of ground operations organizations, with the personnel 
involved in the mission, and ground systems, that group together all ground infrastructure 
required to support the mission from its preparatory stage to completion” (Fortescue, 
Swinerd, and Stark 2011). All ground segments provide for TT&C operations while on 
orbit, as well as support test, launch, and initialization activities of the satellite. The 
complexity trades done during satellite design, however, result in a diverse range of 
complexity in satellite ground segments. Ground segments may be single stations with a 
small footprint and no operators on console maintaining the mission, health, and safety of 
the vehicle. This approach is often referred to as “lights out” ops; in other words, no 
reason exists to leave the lights on since operators will not be on site. Another ground 
segment approach, typically used for more complex or critical satellites, is to have 
multiple connected ground stations providing additional capabilities and a more resilient 
architecture.  
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This architecture and implementation is common for most national security space 
systems. The Air Force currently maintains a primary consolidated satellite operation 
center (SOC) at Schriever Air Force Base outside Colorado Springs, Colorado, as well as 
backup SOC facilities and a series of ground stations with antennas around the world to 
communicate with a variety of military satellites in multiple orbits known as the Air 
Force satellite control network. Figure 3 is an aerial photograph of the Defense Support 
Program’s (DSP) ground station located at Buckley Air Force Base, an Air Force Space 
Command (AFSPC) base located just east of Denver in Aurora, Colorado. The DSP 
constellation provides overhead persistent infrared coverage in support of an early missile 
warning. The large white radomes seen supporting the DSP constellation, sometimes 
referred to as “golf balls,” cover antenna used to communicate with satellites providing 
both protection from the weather, as well as concealing their pointing direction. The large 
building contains the SOC where operators are in contact with the space vehicles and on 
constant watch for threats across the globe. 
 
 Defense Support Program Control Site. Source: Sellers (2004). Figure 3. 
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A simplified ground segment is comprised of two components. One component 
on the “front end” commands the vehicle and one component on the “back end” receives 
information from the satellite. 
a. Mission Management and Command and Control Element 
The front end of the system is the Mission Management and Command and 
Control System element. This element “flies” the satellite. This element generally 
encompasses a scheduling component to plan and deconflict future activities of the 
satellite or a constellation of satellites, as well as an element that contains executable 
scripts, libraries, databases, and space vehicle constraints specific to each spacecraft. The 
scheduler accesses these vehicle unique features to deconflict and plan the activities for 
the command and control element to execute. 
b. Processing Element 
The back end of the ground segment is the processing element. This element 
receives space vehicle telemetry, ephemeris, and mission data. A combination of 
hardware and software receives, demodulates, and formats the downlinked data, then in 
the case of many national security space assets, the downlink data may be encrypted and 
need to be decrypted. Mission operators use vehicle telemetry and ephemeris to ensure 
nominal health and the safety of the vehicle. Mission data from the payload may be 
processed onsite or sent to an offsite location for final processing. Depending on the size 
of mission data being processed, a simple central processing unit based (CPU) computer 
can handle the volume; however, it may require significantly larger “monolithic” sized 
computer systems. In addition, a significant amount of vehicle or mission specific 
processing code and algorithm chains must be computed before the data is transformed 
into its final product. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced at a high level the types of spacecraft employed by U.S. 
national security and their supporting subsystems, in space, and on the ground, that are 
susceptible to space weather effects. Both space and ground segments are susceptible to 
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interference and damage from space weather. The ground systems are generally well 
protected by the Earth’s magnetic field and atmosphere. National security spacecraft, 
however, are expected to execute their mission consistently through the harsh space 
environment. The next chapter discusses that environment. 
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III. SPACE WEATHER AND ITS IMPACTS TO SPACECRAFT 
To understand the effects and impacts to space vehicles from space weather, it is 
important to understand the physical relationship between these spacecraft and the near 
Earth space environment. The Sun’s energy interacting with the Earth’s magnetic field and 
atmosphere dominate this environment. This discussion supports the recommendation for 
integrating low-impact space weather sensors on national security satellites. 
A. THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
The space environment has routinely been characterized as harsh and unforgiving. 
In addition to space weather, vehicles unprotected by the Earth’s atmosphere must 
contend with micrometeoroids and man-made debris, the effects of operating in a 
vacuum, and the ever-present effects of gravity. Space weather is primarily influenced by 
the relationship between the Sun’s activity and the Earth’s magnetic field (Figure 4). It is 
worth briefly discussing the interaction between the Sun and the geomagnetic field, as 
well as galactic cosmic rays and their impact on the environment in which U.S. national 
space satellites operate. 
 
 Space Weather Domains. Source: White House Office of Science Figure 4. 
and Technology Policy (2013). 
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1. The Sun 
The Earth’s closest star, the Sun, is the origin of the most dynamic space weather. 
At its core, this great ball of gas produces significant energy through nuclear fusion that 
converts hydrogen to helium, the two majority elements of the Sun. The Sun is 
moderately sized relative to the billions of other stars in the universe, but it is still 
massive, 1.99 x 1030 kg, and dense, 1.4 x 103 kg/m3. At the edge of the Sun, highly 
energized plasma radiates in all directions. This “solar wind is similar to the composition 
of the Sun’s upper atmosphere (~90% protons, ~10% He++)” (Olsen 2005, 72) and 
travels at speeds of up to “~700 kilometers per second” (72).  
The surface of the Sun’s gaseous equator spins at a faster rate than the poles. This 
differential rotation causes the Sun’s magnetic field to warp and twist, causing 
disturbances at the Sun’s surface that result in prominences, which are “extrusions of 
‘cold’ chromospheric gas into the corona from active regions of enhanced magnetic field 
strength” (Olsen 2005, 57). The twisted magnetic field also leads to the highly energetic 
“hot” solar flares often from areas of activity called sunspots (Figure 5). Less frequently, 
a coronal mass ejection (CME) can manifest and eject coronal material at speeds 
exceeding 1,000 km/s. 
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 Sunspots as Sketched by Richard Carrington of Sunspots on Figure 5. 
September 1, 1859. Source: Carlowicz and Lopez (2002, 54). 
2. Heliosphere 
The solar wind creates a barrier, or bubble, between our solar system and the 
interstellar matter that exists between our Sun and the other stars, with their own 
heliosphere. The distance between the earth and the Sun is just a fraction of the extent of 
the heliosphere. One astronomical unit (AU) represents the distance between the Sun and 
the Earth, about 150 million km. Voyager 1 was launched in 1977 to study the deep space 
environment and crossed the heliopause in 2012. The heliopause is the edge of the 
heliosphere, a distance of about 120 AU or “18 billion kilometers” (White House Office 
of Science and Technology Policy 2013, 9) from the Sun. National security space 
satellites do not operate at these great distances; however, its interaction with the Earth’s 
magnetosphere is the source of dynamic near Earth space weather. “It takes 
approximately eight minutes for solar photons traveling at the speed of light to reach 
Earth, whereas it can take up to several days for the solar wind and intermittent solar 
gases emitted from the Sun in the form of CMEs to cover the same distance” (10). 
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3. Magnetosphere 
This “region of space surrounding the earth in which the geomagnetic field plays 
a dominant role” is the magnetosphere (Olsen 2005, 109). The interaction between the 
solar wind and the Earth’s magnetic field is the primary cause of space weather (Figure 
6). Significant amounts of energy are transferred into the near earth environment. The 
robust and inconsistent fluctuations in the speed of the radiative output from the Sun 
cause great distortions in the magnetosphere, and with it, inconsistencies and variations in 
the radiation and charged environment. Often associated with CME impacts with the 
Earth, “geomagnetic storms occur when energy transferred from the solar wind is 
deposited in the magnetotail, sometimes building up to the point whereby a fraction of 
the energy is dumped into the near-Earth space environment in the form of a magnetic 
substorm” (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 2013, 10).  
Explorer I, the first U.S. satellite, was equipped with sensors that discovered the 
geomagnetic field and the trapped ionized high-energy particles of the Van Allen 
radiation belts named for the experiment’s lead physicist. Radiation energy varies in this 
region from ~1,000 to 60,000 kilometers but some particles can reach relativistic speeds. 
These particles “have velocities near the speed of light and carry tremendous amounts of 
kinetic energy” (Moldwin 2008, 53). 
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 Artist Depiction of the Magnetosphere. Figure 6. 
Source: ESA and NASA (2015). 
4. Van Allen Radiation Belts 
Energetic particles trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field were hypothesized and 
later proven by American astrophysicist James Van Allen. His advocacy to host a 
scientific experiment perceptive to energetic particles on the United States’ first and 
follow-on satellites led to the discovery of two rings of charged particles consisting of 
protons and electrons trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field. These rings “are comprised of 
two regions of electrons, peaking at about 3,000 km and 25,000 km, and a single region 
of protons, peaking at about 3000 km” (Tribble 2003, 158). These two rings are usually 
referred to as the inner and outer belts. The “valley between them is sometimes called the 
slot region” (158). 
This traditional understanding of the two-belt arrangement has recently been 
modified, as it is now proven that these belts are manipulated along with the Earth’s 
magnetic field from the effects of space weather. Two probes named after the man who 
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discovered these belts were “launched on August 30, 2012…[and] just days after the 
special twin spacecraft soared into orbit…the mission has answered one long-standing 
question about the nature and behavior of the belts, and revealed that the outer belt, 
depicted in Figure 7, can split into two separate belts” (Zell 2013). Despite being one of 
the first astronomical discoveries for U.S. satellites, scientists continue to explore and 
learn new impacts from space weather in the near Earth space environment. 
 
 New Representation of the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Figure 7. 
Source: Zell (2013). 
5. South Atlantic Anomaly 
A region of enhanced radiation is a feature at lower altitudes in the South Atlantic 
region “because of the offset and tilt of the geomagnetic axis relative to Earth’s rotation 
axis” (Fortescue, Swinerd, and Stark 2011, 27). Low altitude space vehicles traversing 
through this region are exposed to a higher density of charged particles, particularly high-
energy protons. As a result, a strong correlation of reported spacecraft anomalies has 
occurred while flying through the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA). Figure 8 shows the 
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density of these protons and their penetration into the Earth’s atmosphere with an altitude 
as low as 200 km. 
 
 South Atlantic Anomaly Proton Radiation Belt. Figure 8. 
Source: Fortescue, Swinerd, and Stark (2011, 29). 
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6. Ionosphere 
The region of the Earth’s upper atmosphere from about 50 km to 1,000 km is a 
region of free ions and electrons called the ionosphere. The charged particles have been 
photoionized primarily by ultraviolet energy from the Sun. This layer is particularly 
important for high-frequency communications that bounce off this layer and back to 
earth. RF transmissions from communications satellites and those of the GPS can also be 
influenced by the changing conditions of the ionosphere and design considerations for 
these systems must be implemented to operate through these conditions.  
One visual example of the interaction of geomagnetic storms can be seen in this 
atmospheric layer. The dancing lights of the Aurora flow along the magnetic field lines 
radiating out of the poles when atmospheric gasses are excited by charged particles near 
the E-Region (Figure 9). 
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 Electron Density as a Function of Altitude. Figure 9. 
Source: Olsen (2005, 160). 
B. AREAS OF OPERATION 
Like ships at sea, satellites sail the ocean of space. And, like their 
terrestrial counterparts, satellites must endure severe storms in the 
environment in order to perform their mission. 
 —NOAA (2008, 1) 
National security spacecraft operate in a variety of orbits (Figure 10). Spacecraft 
operating in each of these orbits are exposed to different space environment conditions 
and must be designed and built to withstand these conditions. To design and build a 
spacecraft to operate through these varying conditions, the engineering team must 
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understand the orbits and their relationship with space weather. A general understanding 
of the space environmental conditions in each orbit is understood, but limited sensor data 
restricts the ability to optimize each national security spacecraft for each specific orbit. 
Each orbit presents a unique space environment challenge. 
 
 The Four Main Types of Orbits. Figure 10. 
Source: Moldwin (2008, 80). 
1. Low-Earth Orbit 
Space vehicles with an orbit below ~2,000 km are considered to be in LEO. 
Spacecraft must orbit above an altitude of ~160 km to maintain a sustainable orbit due to 
the drag induced by the upper atmosphere at that altitude. Most LEO vehicles maintain an 
orbit somewhere between 300 and 1,000 km to take operational advantage of this orbit.  
The advantage of this orbit is its relative closeness to the Earth’s surface, 
particularly for remote sensing satellites. For example, DigitalGlobe’s WorldView 
panchromatic (black and white) electro-optical and shortwave infrared imagery satellites 
operate in this orbit. A disadvantage of this orbit is the spacecraft’s relative fast overflight 
speed and short dwell time across the landscape below. A space vehicle in this orbit has a 
very short dwell time “over the horizon” and may require multiple ground stations for 
direct downlink of data or require a cross-link communications satellite at GEO or HEO 
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to provide a bent-pipe communications capability. Additionally, depending on the apogee 
and perigee, seen in Figure 10, of the orbit, the vehicle may encounter drag resistance and 
encounter the highly energetic charged particles of the upper atmosphere. 
2. Medium-Earth Orbit 
By far, the most recognizable space vehicles in mid-earth orbit (MEO) are 
position, navigation, and timing space vehicles, including the United States’ GPS. In 
addition to GPS, the European Union’s GALILEO and the Russian Federation’s 
GLONASS PNT systems are also deployed in MEO. This orbit at ~20,000 km results in 
about a 12-hour orbital period (the time it takes to complete one orbit). While most of the 
satellites in MEO reside around 20,000 km, MEO is considered the appropriate category 
for any space vehicle operating between LEO from ~2,000 km to GEO at 42,000 km. 
3. Geosynchronous Orbit 
This orbit shares a special relationship with the rotation of the Earth. A space 
vehicle placed in a circular orbit about 35,000 km away from the Earth’s surface, about 
6.6 RE, with low inclination along the equatorial plane, will track over the same relative 
position on the ground. This orbit is both GEO and geostationary orbit. Geostationary 
refers to the space vehicle’s ground track staying relatively constant over the same spot 
on Earth along the equator. From this vantage point, one ground station with a fixed 
antenna can communicate with the vehicle and the vehicle has line-of-site 
communications to most areas over that side of the globe. For this reason, GEO “has 
become the world standard for most communications satellites” (Gordon and Morgan 
1993, 5). A constellation consisting of four or five evenly spaced vehicles at GEO can 
provide almost worldwide coverage. The northern and southern most latitudes are the 
exception, where space vehicle transmissions must pass through significantly more 
atmosphere, which degrades signal strength.  
Not all GEO orbits are also geostationary. Some space vehicles are placed in a 
GEO orbit with an inclination that creates a ground track oscillating between either side 
of the equator into the northern and southern hemispheres. An advantage to this orbit can 
 32
be a longer dwell time over specific regions or better direct line-of-site to a ground target; 
however, this architecture would require multiple satellites for persistent coverage.  
An example of this architecture is the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) in an 
asymmetric figure-8 GEO seen in Figure 11. QZSS is designed to be a NPT and 
communications augmentation satellite that improves NPT accuracy over Japan. The 
vehicle loiters at higher altitudes longer over the area of Japan. 
  
 Asymmetric Figure-8 Geosynchronous Orbit Ground Track. Figure 11. 
Source: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2003). 
This system, made up of “at least four satellites” (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
2003), also allows for a more advantageous angle of incidence than the GPS system to 




 NPT Improvement in Japanese Urban Canyons. Figure 12. 
Source: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2003). 
4. High-Earth Orbit 
In the same way the asymmetric figure-8 geosynchronous orbit provides specific 
regional advantages, the HEO orbit provides longer dwell times over high latitudes. Due 
to the disproportionate population density in the northern hemisphere, these orbits are 
often characterized by long dwell times over the northern latitudes. A space vehicle in 
this orbit meets its perigee at high speed over the Antarctic and loiters near apogee over 
the northern hemisphere at very high altitudes.  
A specific HEO orbit has often been utilized for Soviet and Russian 
communications satellites, referred to as Molniya. This orbit allows the space vehicles to 
dwell over the Soviet states for many hours throughout the day. HEO orbits can 
complement GEO satellites for full earth coverage. SBIRS, the U.S. missile warning 
constellation, combines GEO vehicles with HEO payloads to allow perceptivity to 
missile launches from polar regions where Russian nuclear submarines patrol. 
C. THE SPACE WEATHER ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS 
The United States invested a significant amount of resources during the Cold War 
to develop and deploy satellite systems in support of national security; however, while 
“developing [space] technology provided an unprecedented vantage point for the United 
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States, [it] also posed unprecedented technological challenges” (Berkowitz 2011, V). The 
harsh environment of space requires distinct design considerations for the space 
environment. Space environment effects can be divided into “five categories: vacuum, 
neutral, plasma, radiation, and micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD)” (Tribble 2003, 3). 
The plasma and radiation environments are a significant contributor to spacecraft 
anomalies. From 1974 to 1999, “the National Geophysical Data Center recorded over 
4500 spacecraft anomalies or malfunctions that have been traced to the effects of the 
space radiation environment” alone (Howard and Hardage 1999, 11). The neutral 
environments also contribute to spacecraft anomalies, to a lesser degree, and are briefly 
discussed later. Vacuum and MMOD environments are not significantly affected by the 
Sun’s variable activity and are not relevant to the recommendations made in this paper, 
and for these reasons, are not discussed. The primary focus of this paper’s 
recommendation is concerned with the plasma and radiation environmental effects on 
spacecraft. 
For comparison, Table 1, from Aerospace Corporation report number ATR-
2008(8073)-5, lists the hazards of the plasma and radiation environment effects, the 
particle population that causes these problems, and the time it takes for these the effects 
to impact the spacecraft. 
Table 1.   Space Environment Hazards. Source: O’Brien et al. (2008, 1). 
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1. Neutral Environment 
Space vehicles in LEO are still affected by the uppermost regions of the Earth’s 
atmosphere. Despite the very low atmospheric density hundreds of kilometers above the 
Earth’s surface, LEO vehicles traveling close to eight kilometers per second still interact 
with enough atoms, mostly atomic oxygen, to affect the vehicles’ velocity. Atomic 
oxygen levels also vary dependent on solar activity and react chemically with some space 
vehicle materials. 
a. Aerodynamic Drag 
Aerodynamic drag is a real threat to LEO space vehicles as this “frictional force 
causes the spacecraft to lose altitude, which moves it into a denser neutral atmosphere… 
[causing] increased drag, which lowers the satellite into even denser atmosphere” 
(Moldwin 2008, 81), thus worsening the problem. Many LEO vehicles, to include the 
ISS, have a propulsion system with enough fuel onboard to increase their orbital altitude 
periodically through the design life of the vehicle. These orbit adjust maneuvers (OAM) 
are a part of basic planned space vehicle maintenance activities for many LEO vehicles. 
Sun activity can affect the atmospheric density and cause problems for satellite tracking. 
See Figure 13. 
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 Number of Satellites Lost in Connection with the March 13–14, Figure 13. 
1989, Storm. Source: Space Weather Prediction Center (2015). 
b. Atomic Oxygen 
Ultraviolet radiation from the Sun “dissociates molecular oxygen, above 100 
kilometers” (Wertz and Larson 2007, 211) from the Earth’s surface. Atomic oxygen is 
known to cause “oxidation or erosion and general degradation of materials properties” 
(Tribble 2003, 84). The amount of radiation from the sun varies with the solar cycle and 
directly relates to the amount of atomic oxygen in the upper atmosphere. 
c. Plasma Environment 
The least prevalent fundamental state of matter on Earth is actually incredibly 
abundant outside the Earth’s atmosphere; in fact, “over 99% of the universe, the Sun, and 
the stars, is a plasma” (Tribble 2003, 115). This plasma made of very high energy 
negatively charged electrons and positively charged ions can cause problems for the 
spacecraft that operate in this environment. Components on the vehicle, built of differing 
material, “conductors and dielectrics, will charge to different potentials in the presence of 
plasma” (Tribble 2003, 115). Additionally, “an object that is subjected to an unequal flux 
of ions and electrons will develop a net charge” (129). This electric potential can grow to 
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the point where an electrostatic arc occurs between components, which is often referred 
to as an electrostatic discharge (ESD) event. An ESD event can generate 
“electromagnetic interference (EMI) from such arcs [that] can cause spacecraft to operate 
erratically” (Wertz and Larson 2007, 213). When “the potential difference across a 
dielectric exceeds the material’s inherent breakdown characteristics,” the dielectric can 
break down as seen in Figure 14. 
 
 Defects in Dielectric Material after Exposure to Electric Field. Figure 14. 
Source: Moldwin (2008, 84). 
Spacecraft designers can minimize charging by preventing the “buildup of large 
potentials by actively balancing currents to spacecraft surfaces [or] prevent differential 
charging of surfaces by insuring that the entire surface is of uniform conductivity” 
(Tribble 2003, 145). These techniques are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Plasma Environment Effects Design Guidelines. 
Source: Tribble (2003, 145). 
Uniform Surface Conductivity Make exterior surfaces of uniform 
conductivity if possible 
ESD Immunity Utilize uniform spacecraft ground, 
electromagnetic shielding, and filtering on 
all electronic boxes 
Active Current Balance Consider flying a plasma contactor or a 
plasma thruster 
 
2. Radiation Environment 
The radiation trapped in the Van Allen belts “differ significantly from the lower-
energy particles that compose the plasma environment” (Tribble 2003, 153), and deserve 
special consideration for the impact they have on spacecraft. In the field of spacecraft 
design, radiation impacts must always be considered because a space vehicle will interact 
with trapped particles or transient particles from the Sun or interstellar sources in any 
orbit (Figure 15). 
  
 Cartoon Depicting All the Radiation Types that a Spacecraft Can Figure 15. 
Experience. Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 2). 
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In Figure 16, the trapped particles in the Van Allen belts are illustrated in the 
Earth’s radiation belts along with the impacts from solar flares and galactic cosmic 
radiation. The primary source of radiation to space vehicles is “comprised of two regions 
of electrons, peaking at about 3000 km and 25,000 km, and a single region of protons, 
peaking at about 3000 km (Tribble 2003, 158)” as presented in Figure 16. The Van Allen 
radiation belts, “proton energies range from 0.01 to 400 MeV [and] electron energies are 
in the range from 0.4 to 4.5 MeV” (Fortescue, Swinerd, and Stark 2011, 27). These 
particles “have a large amount of kinetic energy and can have a permanent effect upon 
the material through which they pass” (30).  
 
 The Structure of the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Figure 16. 
Source: Fortescue, Swinerd, and Stark (2011, 30). 
The relatively consistent solar wind is a secondary source of radiation, and 
“consists of low energy electrons and protons and is typically only energetically 
significant for externally mounted spacecraft components” (Howard and Hardage 1999, 
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3). Compared to other radiation sources, the solar wind is relatively insignificant. Solar 
flares and galactic cosmic radiation pose more significant challenges for spacecraft 
engineers.  
At times, magnetic disruptions on the Sun’s surface can lead to an explosion of 
energetic particles in the form of solar flares that reach the Earth a day or two after their 
release. This activity can have significant influences on the magnetosphere and the 
radiation environment where national security spacecraft operate. The “flare can produce 
energetic protons and heavy ions that will produce effects in electronics” (Howard and 
Hardage 1999, 3) Solar activity, to include sun spots and their associated solar flares, 
trend on an 11-year solar cycle, as seen in Figure 17. 
 
 Sunspot Activity. Source: Poppe and Jorden (2006, 25). Figure 17. 
Finally, galactic cosmic radiation appears to exist uniformly across the universe 
and “consists of a low flux, ~4 particles/cm2s of energetic, 108–1019 eV, ionized nuclei” 
(Tribble 2003, 161). These particles have an ever-present impact to spacecraft on orbit, 
but their effects tend to be most present in times of solar minimum. Figure 18 presents 
the relationship between particle flux and particle energy for the different energetic 
particles in the near earth environment. These range from the high flux, low energy solar 
winds to low flux, high energy galactic cosmic rays. 
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 Particle Flux and Particle Energy. Figure 18. 
Source: MIT OCW (2006). 
Energetic electrons, protons, and heavy ions can wreak havoc on a spacecraft. 
Figure 19 shows how electronic and nuclear integrations can lead to total ionizing dose, 
displacement damage, and single event effects. 
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 Diagram of Radiation Environment Effects on Figure 19. 
Electronic Systems. Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 8). 
The amount of energy received by a material that results in ionization of the 
material is the total ionizing dose (TID). Energy from the radiation environment can excite 
an atom’s electrons into a higher energy state that frees them from the now positively 
charged ion; “these electrons, or more correctly the positive charge created by ionization, 
are the prime cause of the total ionizing dose effects” (Howard and Hardage 1999, 9). 
When spacecraft electronics are exposed to radiation, and this ionization effect takes place 
within their semiconductors, the properties of the dialectic material change and may “allow 
small leakage currents to flow,…although this sounds fairly benign, it can lead to long-term 
consequences” (Tribble 2003, 181). Elaboration of these consequences on spacecraft 
electronics is summarized in NASA Technical Paper-1999-209373: 
In general, all types of electronics are susceptible to ionization but the 
charge generated inside the semiconductor material can quickly be 
collected and removed without ill effect (assuming the radiation 
interaction rate is at a low level of the space environment). If a 
semiconductor device contains, for example, a silicon dioxide/silicon 
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interface (as in all modern integrated circuits based on complementary 
metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology), charge generated inside 
the oxide can become trapped at the interface. This trapped charge, by 
charging the potential of the interface structure, can lead to increased 
“leakage” current or changed operational characteristics of any device 
using this structure. (Howard and Hardage 1999) 
The dose of radiation absorbed by a material is referred to as rad, and is defined as “that 
amount of any kind of radiation which deposits 10–2 J per kg of material” (Tribble 2003, 
176).  
Excited by radiation, the entire atom’s energy level can increase, “increasing 
vibrational motion of the atoms” (Howard and Hardage 1999, 11) to a state where that 
atom actually escapes the influence of the nearby atoms and flows out of its position in 
the material’s crystalline structure. This displacement of the atom is known as 
displacement damage. The crystalline structure’s “regular order gives semiconductor 
materials their unique properties, the disturbance causes changes in the operation of any 
device exposed to this environment” (11). Over time, radiation induced displacement 
damage degrades the performance of the semiconducting material. 
One of the more susceptible components on a spacecraft to displacement damage 
is the solar cell. This displacement damage is disconcerting considering the primary 
means for generating electricity to power near Earth satellites are solar arrays comprised 
of many small solar cells. The degradation in solar cell performance, caused by the total 
dose effects, is a life limiting consideration during spacecraft design. 
The ionized particles carry a charge and “a number of detectors, switches, and 
current and voltage regulators can observe a pulse of charge as the particle interacts with 
the circuit” (Moldwin 2008, 85) known as a single event effect. Several specific effects 
are defined in Table 3 and can cause anomalies that may degrade or remove the 
spacecraft from operations for a period of time, or also have the potential for devastating 
effects that cause a premature end of mission. 
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Table 3.   Listing of Single Event Effects. 
Source: Howard and Hardage (1999, 13). 
Acronym Effect Description 
SEU Upset Digital circuit changes logic state 
SEL Latchup Device switches to a destructive, high current state 
SEGR Gate Rupture Destructive failure of a power transistor 
SEB Burnout Another mode of destructive failure for a power transistor 
SEFI Functional Interrupt Device enters mode where it is no longer performing the designed 
function 
SEMBE Multiple Bit Error More than one logic state change from one ion 
SET Transient Transient current in circuit 
SEIDC Induce Dark Current Increased dark current in CCD arrays 
 
Single event effects occur when “a heavy ion is incident on the sensitive area of an 
integrated circuit, producing sufficient charge in the form of electron—hole pairs to cause a 
change in the logic state of the device” (Fortescue Swinerd, and Stark, 2011, 43). These 
effects can cause a minor non-permanent upset in operations but they also have the 
potential to impact “critical circuitry such as a control system or decision-making logic, 
[where] it can have serious consequences on the spacecraft operation—generating false 
commands such as thruster firings” (43). Such events can be life limiting or life ending for 
national security spacecraft. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter covered the space environment and the effects it can have on all 
spacecraft including those deployed for U.S. national security. Vacuum, the neutral 
environment, the plasma environment, radiation, and orbital debris all impact spacecraft 
design and operations. The plasma and radiation environments have the potential to disrupt 
national security space satellite operations significantly. The current space weather 
situational awareness architecture, discussed in the next chapter, is inadequate to meet the 
emerging space situational awareness needs of national space systems. 
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IV. CURRENT SPACE WEATHER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
The White House explicitly acknowledges that U.S. space capabilities are critical 
to U.S. national security interests: 
The United States will pursue the following goals in its national space 
programs: Improve space-based Earth and solar observation capabilities 
needed to conduct science, forecast terrestrial and near-Earth space 
weather, monitor climate and global change, manage natural resources, 
and support disaster response and recovery. (White House 2010b, 4) 
A. STAKEHOLDERS 
The United States is currently and increasingly reliant on space-based capabilities. 
This paper is focused on national security space systems but the U.S. government deploys 
many space-based satellites that support many aspects of an American’s day-to-day life. 
The Department of Commerce (DOC), NASA, and the National Weather Service are 
primary stakeholders concerned with current and forecasted space weather. The DOC 
provides an expanded list of consumers of space weather data. The following list from 
NOAA summarizes some of these consumers and their respective uses of weather data: 
Electric Power Grid Operators use geomagnetic storm detection and 
warning products to maximize power grid stability and to mitigate power 
grid component damage and large-scale blackouts. 
Spacecraft Launch Operators use radiation products to avoid electronic 
problems on navigation systems, preventing launch vehicles from going 
off course and being destroyed. 
Spacecraft Operations and Design staff rely on space weather products to 
avoid electronic problems. Space weather effects on satellites vary from 
simple repairs to total mission failure. 
Manned Spaceflight activities are altered to avoid or mitigate effects of 
radiation storms impacting crews and technological systems. 
Navigation Systems depend on space weather information to ensure the 
integrity and safe use of electronic navigational systems, such as GPS. 
Aviation Operators use crucial information on space weather impacts—
such as communication outages, potentially harmful radiation, and 
navigation errors—to adjust routes and altitudes. 
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Communications Operators anticipate and react to space weather activity 
to mitigate impacts occurring over a wide range of communications 
frequencies used by emergency management officials, search and rescue 
systems, and many others. 
Surveying and Drilling Operations rely on accurate and timely space 
weather products for safe and efficient high-resolution land surveying and 
sea drilling. (2012, 4)  
These stakeholders represent the larger domestic community that is reliant on 
space for day-to-day operations. U.S. national interests and national security are reliant 
upon these stockholders’ uninterrupted access to space. This diverse community is 
increasingly dependent on space-based capabilities vulnerable to space weather effects. 
B. REQUIREMENTS 
National security space systems support the United States’ ability to project 
power in the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains. In 2013, the 
Executive Office of the President requested the Office of the Federal Coordinator for 
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research (OFCM) “to lead a study to assess (1) 
the current and planned space weather observing systems and (2) the capacity of those 
systems to meet operational space weather forecasting requirements over the next 10 
years” (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 2013, iii). The study 
assessed the following DOD, DOC, and NASA documents to consolidate space weather 
observation requirements: 
 NOAA Consolidated Operations Requirements List, 2011 (DOC).  
 NOAA Program Observation Requirements Document—Space Weather 
Program, 2009 (DOC).  
 Air Force Weather Space Weather Implementation Plan, Oct 2010 (DOD).  
 Initial Capabilities Document for Meteorological and Oceanographic 
Environment, 2009 (DOD).  
 Integrated Space Weather Analysis System Data Requirements, 2011 
(NASA).  
 Space Radiation Analysis Group Requirements, 2011 (NASA).  
 47
 Four-Dimensional Weather Functional Requirements for NexGen Air 
Traffic Management, 2008 (Joint Planning Development Office Weather 
Functional Requirements Study Group 2013, 12). 
From these documents, the OFCM generated Table 4 to consolidate the United 
States’ space weather observing requirements. 
Table 4.   Observing Requirements by Space Weather Domain Space Weather 
Observing Systems. Source: White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (2013, 13). 
 
 
These requirements are generally comprehensive in nature and do not support 
direct measurements from targeted sensors integrated on national security spacecraft. 
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C. ARCHITECTURE 
The space weather observation architecture includes systems both on the ground 
and on orbit (Figure 20). These systems are poised ready to sense changes in space 
weather conditions and report those changes to ground operation centers. These operation 
centers receive and process the data from multiple sensors, and using models and 
analytical tools, the teams at these operations centers can provide useful products to the 
end users. These products include current conditions, future forecasts, and notifications of 
potential space weather threats. 
 
 Space Weather Architecture. Source: White House Figure 20. 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (2013, 8). 
1. Observation Systems 
The United States and its allies attempt to fulfill the requirements outlined in 
Table 4 with both ground-based and space-based observing systems. The DOD, NASA, 
 49
civil and foreign space sensors, and ground-based-sensors depicted in Figure 21 help 
form a comprehensive understanding of the space weather environment. 
 
 Space Weather Observing Systems. Source: White House Figure 21. 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (2013, 13). 
a. Ground-Based Sensors 
The ground-based collection of space weather sensors are mostly comprised of 
sensors intended to understand better ionosphere conditions and optical telescopes used 
to monitor the Sun’s activity. Ground-based sensors provide critical information to space 
weather operation centers, particularly information about the ionosphere, but ground-
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based sensors “sparse coverage limits their utility meeting operational requirements” 
(White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 2013, 30). 
b. Space-Based Sensors 
Space-based weather sensors can be divided and defined in two categories, 
comprehensive space weather sensors and targeted space weather sensors. From 
Aerospace Corporation technical report ATR-2008(8073)-5, both targeted sensors and 
comprehensive sensors are defined: 
(1) Targeted sensors that are capable of measuring the environment and 
effects at a level sufficient for providing situational awareness of specific 
effects for the host spacecraft; and (2) Comprehensive sensors that are 
capable of providing detailed environment measurements for a wide 
variety of effects and to map those measurements to a broad region of 
near-Earth space, providing global situational awareness and quantitative 
characterization of the environment climatology for the design of future 
space systems. (O’Brien et al. 2008, iii) 
From that same report, Table 5 provides a list of comprehensive and targeted space 
weather sensors. 
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Table 5.   Examples of Space Environment Sensors for Operational Vehicles. 
Source: O’Brien et al. (2008, 2). 
 
 
Comprehensive sensors, like those aboard the Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program (DMSP), provide a broad understanding of the space weather environment. 
These sensors, typically aboard dedicated weather satellites, are used to help inform the 
stakeholders on general space weather conditions. Comprehensive sensors flown in 
multiple orbits not only help current operational users adjust their activities based on 
current and expected conditions but also help inform developers on how to build future 
space vehicles to be more resilient to their expected environments. These vehicles can 
provide a general understanding of space weather conditions, as well as a local 
understanding specific for that specific vehicle.  
Targeted space weather sensors are used primarily to provide localized space 
weather situational awareness around the host vehicle. Targeted space weather sensors 
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are important because like the weather on Earth, where the current weather conditions 
can vary significantly county by county, in the great vastness of space, current space 
weather conditions can vary dramatically from spacecraft to spacecraft. The combination 
of temporal variations created by the Earth’s own magnetic field, spatial variations 
created by the influence of the Earth’s rotation about the Sun allowing solar winds to 
manipulate the magnetosphere, and trapped energetic particles in the Van Allen radiation 
belts, create a dynamic space environment. If people wish to understand the current 
conditions surrounding a space vehicle at the local level, targeted space weather sensors 
that measure the current plasma and radiation environments are required. 
2. Operation Centers 
The DOD, NOAA, international partners, and some U.S. adversaries maintain 
space weather operation centers that consolidate information gathered by ground and 
space-based sensors to understand U.S. current space weather conditions, as well as 
attempt to forecast space weather events and issue alerts, watches, and warnings to 
stakeholders. For the DOD, the responsibility for monitoring and communicating current 
and expected space weather conditions falls to the 2nd Weather Squadron, under the 2nd 
Weather Group, part of the 557th Weather Wing stationed at Offutt Air Force Base, home 
of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. The Air Force maintains its own set of 
comprehensive space weather sensors, and some targeted, to provide national security 
stakeholders with relevant space weather data. 
The Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC), part of NOAA, located in 
Boulder, Colorado is the civilian hub for space weather data collection, product 
development, and information dissemination. The SWPC teams with the U.S. Air Force 
to provide current comprehensive space weather conditions and forecasts.  
The most recognized space weather communication tool is the “NOAA Space 
Weather Scales, designed in 1999, which list three types of storms on Earth as measured 
by three physical parameters of solar activity” (Poppe and Jorden 2006, 122). These 
scales are presented in Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24. The three types of storms 
monitored by NOAA are geomagnetic storms, solar radiation storms, and radio blackout 
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storms. Geomagnetic storms are the disruptions of the Earth’s magnetosphere, disturbed 
by solar activity that can lead to both increased radiation and plasma effects on 
spacecraft. A “k-value” has been established to provide a physical measurement value to 
the significance of these expected magneticspheric impacts. Solar radiation storms are a 
result of increased solar activity that disturbs the nominal radiation environment and can 
increase the potential for spacecraft impacts by increased radiation effects. This 
parameter is measured simply by radiation flux. Finally, the possibility of radio blackouts 
is reported by the SWPC with parameters ranging from “M1 to X20.” These forecasted 
potential blackouts can range from intermittent communications to several hours of 
complete blackouts. The Air Force typically supplies users a simple red, yellow, or green 
scale for radio blackout impacts, solar radiation storm impacts, and geomagnetic storm 
impacts. These crude scales give space vehicle anomaly team directors a “quick look” 
opportunity to see if space weather is a contributing factor to their current problem. 
 
 Geomagnetic Storms. Source: Figure 22. 
Space Weather Prediction Center (2015). 
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 Solar Radiation Storms. Source: Space Figure 23. 
Weather Prediction Center (2015). 
 
 Radio Blackouts. Source: Space Weather Figure 24. 
Prediction Center (2015). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The systems currently deployed to monitor the space weather environment are 
primarily comprehensive in their approach. This data is critical for the stakeholders defined 
previously; however, for national security space systems, this comprehensive approach 
does not provide targeted space environment situational awareness. Inexpensive low-
impact space environment sensors, currently available from industry could be integrated 
into all national security spacecraft today to provide local and targeted space weather data 
for each satellite. 
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V. ASSESSMENT OF INEXPENSIVE LOW-IMPACT TARGETED 
SPACE WEATHER SENSORS 
Previous chapters have introduced the types of satellites deployed by the U.S. 
national security organizations, the spacecraft subsystems, the space environment, and the 
potential negative effects this environment can have on these systems. The current space 
weather monitoring system is comprehensive in its approach, providing a general temporal 
understanding of the current space weather conditions. This approach is not sufficient to 
meet the current and emerging needs of national security spacecraft. This chapter defines 
low-impact space weather sensors, acknowledges their inexpensive availability in industry 
today for both the plasma (spacecraft charging) and radiation environments, and their 
benefits to both the individual spacecraft and the enterprise at large. 
A. REQUIREMENTS TO BE LOW IMPACT 
A low-impact sensor should use minimal space vehicle resources and is easily 
integrated into the space vehicle with minimal impact to the system’s cost, schedule, and 
performance. A size, weight, and power “SWAP” analysis is one of the techniques often 
used during spacecraft design to understand the impacts of changes to the rest of the 
system. Each of these qualities is particularly important to understand fully during 
spacecraft design, as each of these resources is highly constrained on satellites. For 
comparison, large electro-optical telescope systems have significantly different constraints, 
depending on if they are earth-based or on-orbit observatories. For example, the Hubble 
space telescope orbiting about 550 kilometers above the Earth, and the Hiltner telescope at 
the MDM Observatory outside Tucson Arizona, both have 2.4-meter primary mirrors. 
From a size comparison, they both have the same diameter mirrors; however, their weight 
differs significantly. The Hubble’s primary mirror weighs 828 kilograms (NASA 2008) 
compared to the Hiltner’s 2,000 kilograms (Thorstensen and Halpren 2016). Additionally, 
while power management on the Hubble was carefully designed to meet but not exceed 
system requirements to save battery weight, the Hiltner is simply supplied by commercial 
power. Much of the size and weight constraints for satellites are driven by the cost per 
pound for sending a satellite to its final orbit and the capabilities of the launch vehicles.  
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The Hubble was launched on the Space Transportation System, better known as 
the Space Shuttle. NASA has estimated the cost of a shuttle launch to average “out to be 
about $450 million per mission” (Morgan 2000). Independent estimates have declared 
that price to be much higher, but if NASA’s figure is used, then the Hubble weighing in 
at 11,110 kilograms costs about $40,500 per kilogram. At these costs, every gram counts. 
Therefore, a low impact space weather sensor must be very small and very lightweight.  
Batteries, solar arrays, and power management systems are also very heavy. For 
this reason, low impact sensors must not consume much energy from the rest of the system. 
To justify incorporating low impact sensors, the sensors must be able to operate at the 
standard bus power supply levels to eliminate the need for additional power management, 
and battery and solar array sizing must not be impacted. In addition to SWAP concerns, the 
sensors must also be simply integrated into standard C&DH systems for minimal impact to 
the host vehicle. They must also remain stable at the temperatures expected on the host 
vehicle without the need for active or passive thermal management, again to reduce weight 
and cost. Finally, all these low impact requirements reduce system assembly, integration 
and test (AI&T) impacts. Their low impact nature is similar to the integration impacts of a 
common thermistor. Low impact sensors can be integrated off the critical path, while other 
integration activities are ongoing, and not impact the overall spacecraft delivery schedule. 
These requirements keep costs low and ensure “doing-no-harm” to the space 
vehicle. This is key to justify the incorporation of low impact sensors on national security 
space systems. Today, existing technology meets these low impact requirements.  
B. EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES 
Two types of space environment sensors exist today that meet the aforementioned 
low-impact definition and are ready for integration onto today’s national security space 
systems. Small inexpensive spacecraft charging and radiation sensors integrated into the 
space vehicle can provide a targeted look at the conditions around the vehicle and 
monitor the effects the environment may have on the vehicle. Similar to spacecraft 
thermistors that are proliferated about many locations on typical spacecraft, these sensors 
operate on standard bus voltages, communicate with TT&C systems via standard simple 
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interfaces, maintain a readied supply chain to not impact schedule, and have relatively 
insignificant cost compared to the host system. 
1. Surface Charging Sensors 
An example of a spacecraft-charging sensor flown operationally today is the 
Lockheed Martin built charge plate assembly (CPA). This instrument detects charging 
developing on surfaces, which can lead to differential voltage potentials, and possibly 
electrical arcing, causing damage. It has flown on many Lockheed built SES and 
INTELSAT space vehicles. These vehicles have electronic propulsion systems that may 
influence the plasma environment around the space vehicle (SV); thus, Lockheed 
developed integrated CPAs onto the system to study those potential effects. These CPAs 
“design included a 5 cm × 5 cm (2 in × 2 in) aluminum plate painted with Chemglaze 
Z306 dielectric paint bonded to the spacecraft with nonconductive CV2946 adhesive” 
(Likar 2009), as shown in Figure 25. These instruments were also, “configured to provide 
a 0 V to 5 V output compatible with typical spacecraft telemetry format” (Likar 2009), 
which allows for simple integration onto almost any spacecraft. The instrument weighs 
only 0.15 kg. The small exposed panel with minimal support electronics mounted just 
below the space vehicle structure’s surface could be mounted in multiple locations 
around the SV, as seen in Figure 26.  
 
 
 CPA Diagram. Source: Mazur et al. (2010). Figure 25. 
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 CPA Mounted to Spacecraft Panel. Source: Likar (2009). Figure 26. 
The data collected from the CPAs on orbit today have shown that not only do 
spacecraft charging conditions vary significantly from spacecraft to spacecraft that are in 
relatively close proximity, but from one physical structure on the vehicle to the next. Due 
to data collected from this spacecraft, Lockheed concluded that the specific surface 
properties on U.S. national security satellites “are poorly known, making extrapolation of 
environmental data from scientific spacecraft difficult and somewhat uncertain” (Likar 
2009). Large comprehensive environmental monitoring satellites fail to provide the 
needed targeted charging data that small low-impact sensors, like the CPA, could 
provide. 
2. Radiation Sensors 
As previously noted, “the radiation environment is among the more critical 
environments faced by a spacecraft” (Tribble 2003), and this environment also varies 
from spacecraft to spacecraft dependent on astronomical conditions and the vehicle’s 
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position relative to the protective magnetosphere and trapped radiation belts. Like 
spacecraft charging sensors, small inexpensive and low-impact radiation sensors can be 
integrated into national security spacecraft to achieve the desired understanding of the 
local and temporal radiation environment and its potential effects to that specific 
spacecraft. A low impact radiation sensor must effectively observe the total dose and the 
conditions present for potential single event upsets, “the dominant radiation effects under 
space environment resulting in integrated circuit damage” (Daglis 2004). Today, 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COT) instruments exist that meet these requirements. 
Dosimeters have been used for many years on the Earth’s surface and in space to 
measure the radiation environment. These dosimeters, even for space applications, 
“required significant resources” (Mazur et al. 2010) needing significant power and 
weighed several kilograms. These do not meet the requirements of low-impact space 
environment sensors as defined earlier in this chapter. Recent advancements in 
manufacturing have led to the development of the micro dosimeter; “a compact hybrid 
microcircuit that directly measures TID absorbed by an internal silicon test mass” 
(Teledyne Microelectronic Technologies 2015). These devices weigh only 20 grams, 
have a standard 10V to 40V input and standard outputs, “intended to be directly 
connected to most analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) or spacecraft housekeeping 
analog inputs (0–5V range), which makes minimal demands on the host vehicle” 
(Teledyne Microelectronic Technologies 2015). With standard power requirements and 
costing approximately only hundreds to thousands of dollars for all sensors incorporated 
into a single spacecraft, similar to thermistors already prolifically integrated across all 
national security spacecraft today, these sensors meet the low-impact definition 
introduced in this paper. The size of the instrument can be seen in Figure 27 compared to 
a U.S. dime coin. As a result of the instrument’s small size and low-impact requirements, 
it can be installed in multiple locations around spacecraft, and specifically, near radiation 
sensitive payloads and electronics. 
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 Teledyne Micro Dosimeter Size Comparison. Source: Teledyne Figure 27. 
Microelectronic Technologies (2015) 
These low-impact space environment sensors would provide significantly greater 
targeted situational awareness of the space environment, as well as real time data for 
“alerts for hazardous conditions (radiation events), alarms for hostile action, anomaly 
diagnosis real time, [and] allow an operator to shutdown spacecraft until the condition 
passes” (Teledyne Microelectronic Technologies 2015). Integrating these sensors on 
national security satellites would provide great benefits to the acquirer and the warfighter. 
C. BENEFITS OF TARGETED SENSORS 
Today, with the systems previously discussed, the national space community has 
a good understanding of the comprehensive space weather environment; however, much 
like terrestrial weather, space weather can vary significantly from one location to the next 
around the Earth. In the same way, the morning weather forecast in Washington, DC may 
not be as useful to those in Los Angeles getting ready for work in the morning. 
Comprehensive space weather satellites may be able to give spacecraft controllers a 
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general understanding of the physical conditions their satellites may have to operate 
through that day but are not able to provide data on the specific conditions around each 
individual spacecraft.  
In the case where the forecast for solar radiation storms may be moderate, some 
satellites may still see an increased radiation environment while others may encounter a 
nominal environment depending on their orbit and current transition through that orbit. 
The magnetosphere and trapped radiation within the Van Allen belts are constantly 
stressed by the Sun’s activity. Today, using only comprehensive sensors and space 
weather models without information from targeted space weather sensors, it is difficult to 
extrapolate the specific local weather conditions for individual spacecraft. As a result, 
targeted space weather sensors are vital, and have several associated benefits. 
1. Lower Life cycle Costs 
One associated benefit is lower overall life cycle costs. Space weather models are 
used to predict and forecast space weather events and impacts, and they are also used to 
influence the engineering of the space vehicle to ensure that vehicle can survive expected 
design life in predicted conditions. Today’s standard model used to assist in spacecraft 
design is the AE9/AP9/SPM. The AE9 model’s energetic electrons, the AP9 model’s 
energetic protons, and SPM are the standard plasma model. These models, derived from 
the data of 37 space-based environment sensors, shown in Table 6, in multiple orbits, 
were “developed by a collaboration led by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and 
including Aerospace Corporation, Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc. (AER), 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL), and 
Boston College” (Visual Distributed Laboratory 2015). Unfortunately, “the space 
weather community has been held back from modeling the space environment, partly 
because of the shortage of observations and partly because the space environment is 
immense” (Poppe and Jorden 2006, 125). 
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Table 6.   AE9/AP9/SPM: Data Sets. 
Source: Visual Distributed Laboratory (2015, 7). 
 
 
The models used today that inform design decisions are conservative because of 
the relatively few sensors contributing to model development. Conservative models 
translate directly to overly engineered and very expensive space vehicles. In today’s 
fiscally constrained environment, national security space systems cannot afford to be 
built with unnecessary margin. The model developers designed the AE9/AP/SPM models 
“to support periodic updates with new data sets” (Visual Distributed Laboratory 2015). 
Incorporating data from proliferated targeted sensors on national security spacecraft 
would contribute to more realistic models that help better inform future spacecraft design, 
close the design boundaries to more realistic margins, and could lead to lowering cost. 
Satellite/Sensor Orbit Temporal range Energy range Version introduced 
Protons (energy in MeV) 
CRRES/PROTEL 350 × 33000 km, 18° 1990–1991 2.0–80 V1.00 
S3‐3/Telescope 236 × 8048 km, 97.5° 1976–1979 0.1– 2.0 V1.00 
HEO‐F1/Dosimeter 500 × 39000 km, 63° 1994–2011 10–400 V1.00 
HEO‐F3/Dosimeter 500 × 39000 km, 63° 1997–2011 10–400 V1.00 
ICO/Dosimeter 10000 circular, 45° 2001–2009 10–400 V1.00 
TSX5/CEASE 410 × 1710 km, 69° 2001–2006 10–400 V1.00 
POLAR/IPS 5100 × 51000 km, 86° 1996–2008 0.1–1.0 V1.00 
POLAR/HISTp 5100 × 51000 km, 86° 1996–2008 6.0–15.0 V1.00 
TacSat‐4/CEASE 700 × 12050 km, 63° 2011‐2013 1‐80 V1.20 
Electrons (energy in MeV) 
CRRES/MEA/HEEF 350 × 33000 km, 18° 1990–1991 0.1–7.0 V1.00 
SCATHA/SC3 28000 × 43000 km, 7.8° 1979–1991 0.25–4.5 V1.00 
HEO‐F1/Dos/Tel 500 × 39000 km, 63° 1994–2011 1.5–10.0 V1.00 
HEO‐F3/Dos/Tel 500 × 39000 km, 63° 1997–2011 0.5–5.0 V1.00 
ICO/Dosimeter 1000 km circular, 45° 2001–2009 1.0–7.0 V1.00 
TSX5/CEASE 410 × 1710 km, 69° 2001–2006 0.07–3.0 V1.00 
SAMPEX/PET 550 × 675 km, 82° 1992–2004 2.0–3.5 V1.00 
POLAR/HISTe 5100 × 51000 km, 86° 1996–2008 1.0–6.0 V1.00 
GPS/BDDII ns18 20200 km circular, 55° 1990–1994 0.25–1.0 V1.00 
GPS/BDDII ns24 20200 km circular, 55° 1991–2000 0.25–1.0 V1.00 
GPS/BDDII ns28 20200 km circular, 55° 1992–1996 0.25–1.0 V1.00 
GPS/BDDII ns33 20200 km circular, 55° 1996–2004 0.25–1.0 V1.00 
LANL‐GEO/SOPA 1989‐046 36000 km circular, 0° 1989–2008 0.05–1.5 V1.00 
LANL‐GEO/SOPA 1990‐095 36000 km circular, 0° 1990–2005 0.05–1.5 V1.00 
LANL‐GEO/SOPA LANL‐97A 36000 km circular, 0° 1997–2008 0.05–1.5 V1.00 
LANL‐GEO/SOPA LANL‐02A 36000 km circular, 0° 2002–2008 0.05–1.5 V1.00 
Plasma (energy in keV) 
POLAR/CAMMICE/MICS 5100 × 51000 km, 86° 1997–1999 1.2–1.64 V1.00 
POLAR/HYDRA 5100 × 51000 km, 86° 1997–1999 1.0–40.0 V1.00 
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2. Improved Anomaly Resolution and System Resiliency 
In the event of a spacecraft anomaly, operators monitoring the health and safety of 
the vehicle need to take steps if necessary to “safe” the vehicle. Most national security 
space vehicles have some form of fault protection to allow the vehicle, in an event of an 
anomaly, to safe itself; however, dependent on the hardware and software condition, it 
may require human input to ensure the continued mission capability of the vehicle.  
Once initial steps have been taken, either by the space vehicle’s autonomous fault 
architecture or by commands sent by operators on the ground, and the vehicle is safe for 
an extended period of time, a “war room” is established to address the continued safety of 
the vehicle and return to nominal mission if possible. This anomaly resolution team 
consists of vehicle operators and vehicle engineers, usually comprising both government 
and contractor support. One of the earliest questions the team addresses, before capturing 
additional observables and establishing a path forward, is recording the current space 
weather environment conditions and the defensive counter space condition.  
National security space system’s support organizations have access to DOD, 
NASA, civil and international space observation systems through DOD Space Operation 
Squadrons (SOPS) and National Reconnaissance Office Operations Squadrons (NOPS) 
using NOAA and DOD space weather centers. These centers keep the engineering teams 
supporting on orbit vehicles informed of the potential space weather threat condition. 
The team assesses the “green, yellow, red—quick look.” If space weather is a 
potential contributing factor, the anomaly director may request additional information 
from the space weather squadron to help assist in anomaly resolution. If their anomalous 
space vehicle is not equipped with a targeted space weather sensor, the anomaly response 
team must make an assessment using comprehensive space weather data and models of 
the environment. This data may not contribute enough information to adjudicate 
definitively if space weather was an actual contributor to the anomaly. If the spacecraft 
was not traversing the SAA at the time of a single event upset or other anomalous event, 
then it is very unlikely that space environmental effects can be definitively attributed to 
be the source of the spacecraft anomaly. Even if the vehicle was traversing the SAA, the 
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root cause, the analysis team may wrongly contribute space weather effects to be a 
contributing factor to the spacecraft anomaly. The space weather architecture, as it exists 
today, simply leaves too much ambiguity as to the current radiation and plasma 
environments around national security spacecraft to implicate or exonerate space weather 
and its effects definitively to a current spacecraft anomaly. Targeted space weather 
sensors installed on all national security spacecraft would help to reduce this ambiguity 
significantly. 
The space domain is evolving into an increasingly contested environment. Kinetic 
and non-kinetic threats against U.S. national security space assets are advancing, and 
targeted space weather sensors can assist in quickly discriminating between space 
weather interference and nefarious activity from U.S. advisories. The anomaly response 
team, if their vehicle is equipped with a targeted sensor, could assess actual real-time 
telemetry from their vehicle at the time of the event and more definitively rule in or out 
the possibility of space weather interference.  
The integration of targeted space weather sensors on national security satellites 
would increase the resiliency of U.S. space weather architecture to assure consistent 
access to space weather data. A disaggregated architecture of inexpensive but prolific 
space weather sensors would significantly reduce U.S. reliance on relatively few large 
and complex space weather satellites, where a single failure of one of these spacecraft 
would significantly reduce U.S. space weather situational awareness. This approach 
aligns with the strategic approach recommended by Air Force Space Command 
Commander, General William L. Shelton, in a statement to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, where he advocated for a disaggregated architecture for strategic space 
systems as one potential approach to increase their resiliency. He argued, “disaggregated 
or dispersed constellations of satellites will yield greater survivability, robustness and 
resilience in light of environmental and adversarial threats” (United States Air Force 
Space Command 2013). The same concept is true for disaggregated and dispersed space 
weather sensors. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Over the last several years, as U.S. dependence on space and the need for 
improved space environment situational awareness has increased correspondingly. While 
low impact space weather sensors exist today, their incorporation on to national security 
space systems is still presented with acquisition and integration challenges. Both of these 
challenges, if addressed smartly, can be overcome and are discussed in the next chapter. 
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VI. INTEGRATING TARGETED SENSORS ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY SPACECRAFT 
The previous chapter defined and introduced inexpensive and low-impact space 
weather sensors and their benefits if integrated into all national security spacecraft. This 
chapter discusses the acquisition challenges associated with this integration and the 
relatively simple technical hurdles that must be overcome. This chapter defines and 
addresses two problems. The problems relating to the lack of local space weather data for 
each individual spacecraft are presented followed by the negative impacts at the national 
system level. After defining the problems, the national security space stakeholders are 
defined and an approach to incorporating low-impact targeted sensors to meet these 
stakeholders’ needs is discussed. 
A. ACQUISITION CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS 
The benefits of incorporating low-impact space weather sensors on national 
security satellites solve multiple problems at two levels, at the national system level and 
at the individual spacecraft level. The entire national system acquisitions and operations 
community can benefit from fusing the data from the proliferated sensors to improve 
space weather models to help reduce design margin to the space weather environment, 
which ultimately reduces system cost. Additionally, the nation can benefit from a more 
resilient space weather architecture. At the individual spacecraft level, operators can 
benefit from faster anomaly resolution by exonerating space weather effects or nefarious 
activity, thus increasing spacecraft mission availability. Problems in general exist for “a 
need or a want of a solution that accomplishes something that cannot be done due to 
some objective reason(s), that is, availability, technology, science, opportunity, resources, 
or desire” (Langford 2012). Today, inexpensive low-impact space weather sensors are 
available, the technology exists, the science is proven, and an opportunity and desire exist 
to incorporate these sensors on all national security spacecraft. Aerospace Corporation 
acknowledges there “is a growing consensus in the satellite operations and acquisition 
community that new technologies, new orbits, and new threats will continue to expand 
the need for space environment sensors” (O’Brien et al. 2008, 7). The challenge then for 
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acquiring and incorporating these sensors is recourses, perceived schedule, and cost 
impacts. If these perceived schedule and cost can be overcome, then both the national 
system level and the spacecraft level problems can be solved.  
Resources are not allocated to solve these problems because a formal, written 
requirement does not exist for targeted space environment sensors to be incorporated on all 
national security space systems. The system program office (SPO) responsible for 
developing and deploying new spacecraft does not invest in integrating targeted space 
environment sensors into their systems without a requirement. SPOs receive their 
requirements through the joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS) 
process. Stakeholders use this process to flow their requirements to the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and are 
responsible for “identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military capability 
requirements” (Goldfein 2015, A-1). This process is outlined in Figure 28. 
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 Overview of JCIDS Process and Manual Enclosures. Figure 28. 
Source: Goldfein (2015, A-2). 
From this process, an initial capabilities document (ICD) is drafted, and when 
approved, the responsible acquisition office initiates the space acquisition process 
outlined in Figure 28. An ICD should tell the office what to accomplish through the 
requirements definition, not how to accomplish it, and then the SPO can decide through 
the acquisition process how to meet their requirements. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a 
requirements document for any given system includes a requirement for targeted space 
environment monitoring unless that system’s main mission payload is particularly 
sensitive to environmental effects. That system would then likely be designed to be 
protected from those effects and the program office may decide the integration of 
targeted sensors are a “nice to have” item rather than a requirement. Multiple 
stakeholders are not realizing the benefits of incorporating inexpensive low-impact 
targeted sensors because these resources are not being applied to solve the problems. 
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1. National Security Space Weather Stakeholder Definition 
Today’s space weather architecture is inadequate to meet the national and 
spacecraft level problems identified. Part of the reason why resources have not been 
allocated to solve these problems is the national space community is large, and in many 
ways, organizationally fractured. Additionally, each stakeholder may perceive these 
problems and the benefits realized by solving these problems differently. A stakeholder is 
“one who has a stake in the outcome, is most typically an entity (a person either acting 
alone or representing an organization who can influence the conceptualization or funding 
of the development project” (Langford 2012, 259). Despite each of these stakeholders 
seeing the problem differently, the integration of inexpensive low-impact space 
environment sensors onto all national security satellites can help solve these problems 
both at the spacecraft level, and can also contribute at the national level. Table 7 provides 
a list of stakeholders and their definitions. 
Table 7.   Stakeholders Defined. 
Stakeholders Definition
On-console Operators Team currently monitoring vehicle state of 
health and planning and executing 
scheduled maintenance. 
On-call Support Engineering team at the ready to support 
space vehicle anomalies. 
Engineering Support Team Technical support for on orbit vehicles that 
includes contractor, government, and 
federally funded research and development 
centers (FFRDC) support. 
System Program Office Acquisitions and engineering professionals 
responsible for procuring new satellite 
technology and ensuring the success of 
current on-orbit assets. 
End User of Space Vehicle Data The consumers of the service provided by 
the satellite system. Examples of end users 
are users of GPS receivers, satellite 
communications, and remote sensing 
product analysists. 
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center The agency, part of NOAA’s National 
Weather Service, in Boulder Colorado 
responsible for monitoring space weather 
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Stakeholders Definition
activity through both ground and space-
based sensors. The agency publishes 
current conditions, as well as future 
forecasts. 
Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA) Under the Air Force’s 557th Weather Wing 
and responsible for coordinating with the 
NOAA SWPC and disseminating current 
space weather conditions and projections to 
operators of national security space 
satellites. 
Government and University Modeling 
Centers 
“Developmental test-beds, and prototyping/
transition centers [such as the] Community 
Coordinated Modeling Center, NSF Center 
for Integrated Space Weather Modeling 
and Naval Research Laboratories, Air 
Force Research Laboratory and SWPC” 
(White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy 2013, 8) focused on 
improving current forecasting models to 
predict future space weather conditions. 
Space Weather Researchers Those individuals and teams dedicated to 
improving the scientific understanding of 
space weather and its interactions. 
 
This set of stakeholders is a subset of the space weather stakeholders previously 
described in Chapter IV. These stakeholders are specific to the national security space 
enterprise and have specific needs that can be addressed by incorporating inexpensive 
low impact sensors on each national security satellite. An analysis of their needs is 
captured in the stakeholder analysis. 
2. Stakeholder Analysis 
These stakeholders perceive the problem differently relative to their relationship 
to the space system and the benefits they receive from the integration of targeted space 
weather sensors on national security satellites (Figure 29). For those closest to the 
spacecraft, the on-console operators, their perceived benefit is primarily realized at the 
space vehicle level from the real-time space environment data coming down in a stream 
of telemetry being monitored by those operators. For those furthest away from the 
spacecraft, space weather researchers, the benefits they receive are primarily from the 
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combined data from proliferated sensors over many years. They benefit most from a 
resilient sensor system that gathers data from multiple orbital regimes over many solar 
cycles. 
 
 Stakeholder Benefit Relationship Figure 29. 
On-console operators are typical of national security satellite systems, as it is 
preferred that any abnormalities in their performance be addressed as quickly as possible. 
The team monitors the telemetry displayed at workstations transmitted from the 
spacecraft to the ground element. This team is typically responsible for on-orbit 
scheduled maintenance, planned orbit adjust maneuvers, and are the first responders to 
work anomalies. Integrated space weather sensors on the vehicle would be used the same 
way as other sensors, such as temperature, voltage, and pressure sensors, to monitor the 
vehicle’s state of health. In the event of an anomaly, this team is primarily responsible for 
placing the vehicle into a safe mode of operation and calling in the on-call support team. 
The spacecraft and this team benefits most from targeted space weather sensors by giving 
the on-console operator the capability to monitor the spacecraft environment in real-time 
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and prepare for potential hazardous environmental effects by turning off sensitive 
spacecraft electronics. This preventative, rather than reactionary, approach to operating in 
the hazardous space environment is significantly improved with the incorporation of 
targeted environment sensors. The space environment is vast and environmental 
conditions around specific satellites vary greatly. Relying on comprehensive sensors for 
proactive vehicle safety can be unreliable. At best, it can lead to situations where the 
spacecraft is taken out of service unnecessarily. At worst, it can lead to missed 
opportunities to put the vehicle in a safer configuration and result in damaged and 
degraded hardware and loss of on-orbit capability. On-console operators are not the only 
ones who benefit at the spacecraft level from having targeted sensors incorporated into 
the system. 
On-call and engineering support teams are the next immediate users of localized 
space weather conditions. The targeted sensors can provide environment information to 
support anomaly root cause and corrective action. The on-call team is a smaller group of 
operators and engineers trained to ensure the safety of an on-orbit satellite and return that 
vehicle to normal operations. This team is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 
may also call in additional support from a larger engineering support team who are 
experts in the satellites multiple sub-systems. Local space weather data can help the 
teams quickly adjudicate if space weather was a potential contributing factor to the 
anomalous event by retrieving the space weather sensors telemetry at the time of the 
event with the ability to state definitively if space weather effects may have contributed 
to the current anomaly.  
Local space weather data can assist project officers responsible for on-orbit 
vehicles, as well as developers of future spacecraft in the government system program 
offices. A better, more comprehensive understanding of the specific conditions the 
spacecraft are subjected to can help the team assess impacts to that system and others. 
Specifically, the program office must “address reach back (reactive), reach forward, 
(proactive), horizontal (across adjacent products and programs), and reach across 
(spanning various lines of business within an enterprise, or even across different 
companies and corporations within the industry)” (Hecht 2011, 9) to ensure the success 
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of current and future national space systems. The program office, along with support 
from the engineering support team, determines if design modifications can be made to 
future systems, and if on-orbit operations can be modified to prevent the realized 
environmental impacts. The SPO starts to realize the benefits of targeted space weather 
sensors at both the vehicle level and the greater national system level. 
The NOAA SWPC and AFWA can use localized space weather data from 
individual satellites and incorporate that data with the constellation of comprehensive 
space weather sensors to warn operators better of current space weather conditions, as 
well as improve their forecasts for future space weather activity. These stakeholders 
realize the benefits at the national level where the combined data from each spacecraft’s 
targeted sensors help provide a more comprehensive and real-time understanding of the 
space weather environment to improve space weather forecasting. As a result, spacecraft 
operators, engineering teams, and the program office realize benefits to their specific 
spacecraft with the ability to safe the vehicle proactively from space weather effects, and 
prevent and recover from anomalies, which all contribute to improved mission 
availability. These stakeholders overlap in their combined benefits from integrated 
inexpensive low-impact space weather sensors. 
One of the most compelling uses for the local space weather data is to help 
improve U.S. current space weather models. Government and university modeling 
centers, in collaboration with the SWPC and AFWA, could have access to significantly 
more data than just what the DOD, NASA, and foreign comprehensive space weather 
observing systems currently provide. Trending the data from local space weather sensors 
over time, in addition to the data collected by comprehensive sensors, could significantly 
improve U.S. ability to predict space weather and accurately forecast expected weather to 
the greater community. In addition, improved models can allow the development of 
spacecraft with less margin to realistic environment conditions that ultimately drive down 
cost. 
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B. LOW-RISK, NO-IMPACT SENSOR INTEGRATION 
The systems engineering and sensor integration approach outlined in this paper 
would allow for the incorporation of targeted space weather sensors on all national 
security spacecraft with low, approaching no impact, to cost, schedule, and performance 
of the system, as well as a great benefit to both the system and the national security space 
enterprise. The primary intent is to “do-no-harm” to the host vehicle with negligible cost 
and schedule impacts and no mission performance impacts. This approach contributes to 
resolving one of the two significant challenges preventing targeted sensors from being 
incorporated onto all national security satellites; the perception of potential significant 
cost and schedule impacts to each individual program. 
1. Functional Architecture 
The architecture proposed to support the incorporation of targeted sensors on all 
national security spacecraft does not differ much from the architecture in place today that 
supports both nominal spacecraft command control and processing, as well as the 
consolidation of comprehensive space weather data. In support of defining the differences 
between the proposed architecture and the current architecture, a functional model for 
national security targeted space monitoring is captured in Figure 32. System 
“functionality is a set of functions that is required to produce a particular output” (Buede 
and Miller 2016, 205). The model begins with the function of “sense environment” with 
charged particles, within the plasma environment, and radiation flux as inputs to this 
function. The final output serves to overcome the two problems defined earlier in Chapter 
VI. Targeted data is displayed on the operator’s user interface to support command and 
control decisions and anomaly resolution for individual spacecraft. The larger national 
level problem defined in this chapter is resolved with the function F.7 “perform data 
fusion for multiple spacecraft.” The aggregated targeted data is combined with 
comprehensive data with the output being “fused data for AFWA and NOAA for 
situational awareness and forecasts.” Stepping through this functional architecture and 
the specifics of the physical architecture in the next section proves little modification is 
required to today’s space weather situational awareness architecture, Figure 20. The 
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intent is to acknowledge the areas that require little to no changes and focus on the 
integration approaches where changes must be made. 
In the IDEF0 model, Figure 30, each function of the system is identified within 
the box. For example, the first function, “F.1” is to sense the environment, and “F.2,” or 
the second function of the system, is to capture the sensor output. These functions have 
inputs that are identified coming into the left side of the box and outputs coming out of 
the right side of the box. In this model, the physical mechanisms that perform these 
functions are identified coming into the bottom of the box. No controls are identified in 
this model, as they are not unique to this system, and already accounted for in the current 
space weather architecture. 
The unique function of this proposed architecture is found in F.1, Sense 
Environment. The addition of targeted space weather sensors on all national spacecraft is 
a new function supported by the radiation and spacecraft charging sensors identified in 
Chapter V. F.2 through F.6 are not unique to this proposed architecture. All spacecraft 
capture sensor output, transmit that sensor data to the ground where telemetry is 
processed, stored, and displayed for the operators. In this scenario, the targeted spacecraft 
weather data is just an additional telemetry point that can be passively or actively 
monitored by the operator in the same way a spacecraft’s multiple thermistors are 
monitored. F.7, perform data fusion for multiple spacecraft, is not unique. This function 
already exists in today’s space weather monitoring architecture, but it is important to 
acknowledge the physical modifications that need to be made to support addressing the 
national problem earlier identified.  
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 IDEF0 Model for Targeted Space Environment Monitoring. Figure 30. 
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2. Physical Architecture 
The functional architecture proposed requires some modification to the physical 
architecture. In this model, “the physical architecture provides resources for every 
function identified in the functional architecture” (Buede and Miller 2016, 242). It was 
noted that relatively few modifications to the current satellite physical architecture are 
required to put the mechanisms in place to provide the desired effects at the spacecraft 
and national levels. The mechanisms that support F.2 (Capture sensor output) through F.7 
(Perform data fusion) for multiple spacecraft are mostly in place today and require slight 
modifications. 
The targeted sensors required to support F.1 (Sense Environment) are inexpensive 
and low impact to the spacecraft. They can be placed in multiple locations around the 
spacecraft. Their placement on multiple sides of the spacecraft structure will provide a 
general understanding of the radiation and plasma environments as the vehicle travels its 
orbit around the Earth. These sensors are small enough that they can be placed on or near 
critical spacecraft components, such as the payload or star trackers, or any component 
particularly sensitive to the spacecraft environment. The system designer should use these 
sensors in much the same way they already use thermistors to monitor the temperature of 
thermally sensitive components. These low-impact sensors, as defined in Chapter V, have 
a low power requirement, which does not impact the general sizing requirement of 
spacecraft batteries or modifications to the standard spacecraft bus power distribution 
unit. The micro dosimeter described in Chapter V can accept a wide range of standard 
voltage inputs from “13V to 40V” (Teledyne Microelectronic Technologies 2015, 1). 
Additionally, the micro dosimeter output is a “simple linear analog output [that] connect 
to standard spacecraft housekeeping systems” (Teledyne Microelectronic Technologies 
2015, 1). For these reasons, simple physical modifications must be considered when 
incorporating targeted sensors. Power and data wiring harnesses must be installed to 
support the additional sensors, which is a relatively very low impact modification. The 
wires must be integrated in the standard power supply distribution units and the sensor 
output integrated into the standard spacecraft data bus.  
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To perform functions F.2 (Capture sensor output) through F.5 (Store telemetry 
data) requires no modification with this proposed architecture. The standard C&DH, 
TT&C, Ground Segment and Data Repository mechanisms are already in place for all 
current and proposed national security satellites, and the targeted sensor telemetry can be 
incorporated with the rest of the vehicle’s telemetry with no modification. The 
mechanism that supports F.6 (Display stored telemetry data for operator) may require 
slight modification. The graphical user interface (GUI) would require software changes to 
display this specific telemetry that would not otherwise be displayed. This data would 
likely be monitored in the background on a GUI display accessible by the user but not 
found on the primary display where other more mission critical data is actively 
monitored. The software may also be designed to have certain limits put in place, where 
if the environment exceeds certain levels, a warning or alarm may be displayed if 
conditions for the space vehicle are approaching unsafe levels. This configuration is 
typical for standard spacecraft monitoring, allowing operators to focus on mission needs 
but respond to possible anomalies quickly. These low-impact modifications to the 
mechanisms of the spacecraft and the user interface are all that is required to satisfy the 
first spacecraft level problem, and achieve targeted spacecraft weather data to assist in 
anomaly resolution, threat determination, and proactively protect the spacecraft from 
local environment effects. Additional, relatively minor modifications must be made to the 
mechanism supporting the F.7 function (perform data fusion for multiple spacecraft). 
Data fusion centers, the mechanism that supports F.7 for comprehensive space 
weather data, already exist at the AFWA and NOAA. The challenge would be scaling up 
the components required to transfer the individual spacecraft telemetry to the fusion 
center and sizing the components at the fusion center to process the additional data. 
Scaling up the processing capability at the fusion center is not a challenging problem; 
however, a small investment in the computing infrastructure and software is likely 
required to incorporate the increased amount of space weather data. Some consideration 
may need to be made for national technical means (NTM) satellites operated by the NRO 
and other national security satellites operated by the United States where the specific 
orbit of the spacecraft may be classified or otherwise sensitive. The orbits of these NTM 
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satellites is classified and transmitting their real-time location and space environment 
conditions to a non-classified system, operated by NOAA, would be prohibited. The Joint 
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) or other data consolidation 
centers where NTM data can be processed and stored could report their fused data with 
general observations, in much the same way that comprehensive sensors do today, 
without having to compromise specific NTM operating orbits. In this way, the NTM 
could still contribute to the real-time understanding of the space environment. 
Additionally, they could provide specific data to the government space weather modeling 
teams to improve spacecraft models to realize the benefits outlined in Chapter V. With 
these modifications to the physical architecture in space and ground elements, the 
national level problems defined previously could be solved. 
3. Recommendations for Integration 
To meet the very low cost and “do-no-harm” requirement, it is recommended that 
the low impact targeted space environment sensors be designed into the system during 
the preliminary design phase, prior to the preliminary design review (PDR) and the 
milestone C decision (Figure 31). During this period, the technology development of the 
primary mission is still being finalized. The end of this phase is still considered a 
preliminary design, meaning changes are expected; however, if system designers plan to 
incorporate targeted sensors during this phase, the cost impacts can be minimal. Systems 
engineers can plan for the minimal SWAP impacts far ahead of the finalized design and 
the potential cost and schedule impacts of designing these sensors into the system is very 
low. 
A low risk alternative would be to incorporate these sensors into the system 
design no later than the critical design review (CDR). At this point, the spacecraft 
integration process of procuring material and manipulating it for integrations has not yet 
begun. Plenty of time remains to procure and install the sensor hardware if the design 
properly incorporated the sensors and was approved at the CDR. These sensors do not 
have long procurement cycles, also known as long lead parts. If the interfaces are well 
defined and harness routing has been mapped, no additional costs should be incurred for 
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the design except for the relatively insignificant cost of the sensor hardware. This pre-
CDR approach is only less desirable than the pre-PDR because an additional unplanned, 
but still low, systems engineering cost impact to incorporate the sensors into the final 
design of the system is probably likely. Integrating sensors into the design during the 
build and operations phase would pose a higher cost risk for design modifications and 
potential negative work to readjust harnesses and install unplanned hardware. In addition, 
the integration of unplanned hardware post-CDR without a significant risk reduction 
activity could lead to unintended consequences that impact the primary mission and break 
the do-no-harm requirement. This scenario could be avoided with a risk reduction activity 
that evaluates all interfaces and potential system impacts, but which would drive up costs 
and break the low-cost requirement. 
 
 Space Acquisition Process Overview. Source: The Aerospace Figure 31. 
Corporation (2005, 20). 
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Physical build and integration of these sensors, and the required wiring and 
harnessing, is no more challenging than the incorporation of other low impact sensors on 
the spacecraft, such as thermistors. If the system interfaces with the spacecraft telemetry 
have been designed into the system prior to the CDR, then the sensors would be about as 
challenging to install as thermistors. Thermistors on most spacecraft are found in 
abundance across all payloads and subsystems; they track the temperature on multiple 
components, including but certainly not limited to batteries, actuators, and traveling wave 
tube amplifiers on communications systems. If these space environment sensors are 
designed into the system prior to the CDR, they should be no more complicated than 
other simple sensors used for telemetry on the vehicle. 
4. Validation and Verification 
To meet the stakeholder’s needs, several levels of verification are required at the 
unit, sub-system, and space vehicle level. Integration is “putting parts together in a 
particular order and fashion to demonstrate the requisite system functionalities” 
(Langford 2012, 269). Testing is an important component of integration that 
demonstrates the functionality of these sensors. The space environment sensors will be 
tested first at the unit level and can be tested at the space vehicle level as well.  
To meet the low cost and do-no-harm requirements, the space environment 
sensors should first be verified at the unit level. Testing each individual unit is expensive, 
and “lot testing” is recommended for this type of sensor. Thus, one in every X sensors is 
tested to ensure mission reliability for the entire group of produced sensors. This quality 
assurance approach allows for continued inexpensive manufacturing of the sensors while 
still garnering insight into the reliability of each unit.  
After these sensors are delivered and integrated into the spacecraft, the spacecraft 
typically undergoes several stages of testing. Initial functional and performance testing is 
completed at ambient temperatures and pressures to establish baseline values. At this 
stage, targeted space weather sensors could be tested with minimal impact to the entire 
test schedule. Both the spacecraft charging sensor and the micro dosimeter previously 
introduced have self-test capabilities to ensure functionality at the spacecraft level. For 
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example, the micro dosimeter “incorporates a test function to allow electrical testing of 
the hybrid without the need for a radiation source” (Teledyne Microelectronic 
Technologies 2015). Exposing the spacecraft to a charged particle or radiation 
environment during testing can introduce a risk to both the spacecraft and those building 
the vehicle. A simple self-test is adequate to check the sensor’s functionality although it 
does not provide performance data. 
The performance of each sensor will be established once the spacecraft is 
launched and placed by the launch vehicle in its expected orbit. At this stage, the 
spacecraft operators will monitor spacecraft charging potential and radiation dose, and 
make appropriate preventive and reactive vehicle commands to prevent spacecraft 
damage just as they would with other spacecraft sensors. 
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATING TARGETED SENSORS ON THE 
SPACECRAFT 
This chapter previously introduced a no/low risk approach to integrating space 
weather sensors onto national security spacecraft. The conservative approach is to design 
new spacecraft with the intention of integrating these sensors from the beginning. The 
sensors recommended in this paper have very low resource requirements, so an 
opportunity may arise to incorporate them after the initial design phase with some 
additional risk to the rest of the system. These risks are evaluated in this thesis as low and 
may be recommended for consideration from the spacecraft program offices. 
The least risky approach for incorporating these sensors is to have the requirement 
clearly established prior to starting spacecraft design, milestone C, as depicted in the 
standard spacecraft development plan, Figure 30. If these sensors were incorporated early 
in the design, then the government and contractor team can ensure no harm is done to the 
rest of the vehicle, and the likelihood and consequence of negative impacts associated 
with sensor integration is very low. 
a. Pre-Milestone C 
The lowest risk approach for sensor integration is to incorporate these sensors 
during the concept development phase, phase A, of the space acquisition process, Figure 
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30. During this phase, the team is developing key technologies, defining operations and 
systems requirements, conducting risk reduction activities and trade studies, defining the 
baseline, and starting the initial design. The system requirements review and system 
design review during this phase helps set the baseline, but it is not uncommon to have 
requirements and designs change considerably during phase B prior to the preliminary 
design review/milestone C. Incorporating low-impact space weather sensors after 
milestone C is still low risk but would require more systems engineering effort to 
incorporate the sensor into the build. 
b. Phase C 
During phase C, the design is completed; engineering and requirements are 
locked-down and managed using a configuration control process. At this time, the 
program office would put the new requirement for space weather sensors through an 
engineering review board to assess impacts to the system and risk to the system and 
program execution. Both technical challenges and funding constraints are identified. 
Depending on the vehicle design, sensor integration risk could vary widely between 
national space systems. If the spacecraft ADCNS and TT&C systems are configured to 
allow for additional ingestion of unplanned sensor data, then the impact of adding 
additional space weather sensors may be a minimal impact. 
c. Phase D 
Integrating a space weather sensor in phase D is the highest risk for the program. 
At this stage of development, the design is complete, hardware is being built, and vehicle 
integration has begun. An opportunity may still exist to incorporate the new space 
weather sensors. The vehicle electronics must be able to accept telemetry from a new 
source without modification or a source of telemetry not associated with the vehicle’s 
fault architecture, such as a redundant thermistor, may need to be sacrificed. The space 
low-impact space weather sensors introduced in this thesis have the potential to be 
integrated in place of other spacecraft telemetry sources that use simple linear analog 
outputs with minor modification. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper covered the types of space vehicles currently deployed by the United 
States’ national security space community. Then, the spacecraft subsystems were 
introduced as a foundation for understanding how space weather and its effects can 
impact individual systems. The space environment and its effects can be characterized in 
five domains: vacuum, neutral, plasma, radiation, and orbital debris. Two of these 
domains pose significant threats to national security spacecraft, the plasma, and radiation 
environments, and can be characterized and monitored near real-time by inexpensive and 
low-impact sensors incorporated into each national security satellite. These environments 
both threaten spacecraft with immediate impacts and delayed degraded effects.  
The current comprehensive space weather architecture is inadequate to meet the 
emerging needs of national space systems. Only targeted space weather sensors can 
provide temporal and local space weather situational awareness for specific national 
security spacecraft that improves an operator’s ability to respond to spacecraft anomalies 
and potential adversarial impacts. The amalgamation of the data from these targeted 
space weather sensors will also help to improve space weather models, improving the 
design of all future spacecraft helping to reduce engineering design margin, and drive 
down costs of future vehicles. Sensors proliferated among multiple spacecraft in varying 
orbits will also provide a resilient space weather architecture that is not reliant upon only 
a few very expensive monolithic comprehensive space weather satellites.  
National security space stakeholders perceive their needs for space situational 
awareness differently. The stakeholders defined in Table 7 can perceive their needs 
independently and relative to their expected benefit. Space system operators are primarily 
concerned with spacecraft currently on orbit and would benefit from targeted space 
sensors incorporated onto those spacecraft to help resolve anomalies and differentiate 
between general space weather effects and adversarial threats. The community interested 
in space weather forecasting and space weather model development benefits from the 
combined data set provided by the proliferated space weather sensors on all national 
security satellites. These interests are common but the stakeholders are not unified in 
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presenting a common argument to national security space leadership for incorporating 
inexpensive low-impact space weather sensors on all national security space satellites 
because of their perceived benefit is independent and their chain of command is 
disaggregated.  
Although an established need for targeted space weather sensors on national 
security satellites exists, it is not a formal requirement for all systems. The lack of a 
formal requirement for national security space systems to host space weather sensors is 
the most significant obstacle that prevents the government SPO from integrating these 
sensors on their satellites. While program management offices may acknowledge many of 
the benefits of localized space weather, the lack of firm requirements typically leads to 
funding not being allocated specifically for this capability. This thesis recommends that 
leaders of national security space, at both Air Force Space Command and the NRO, 
mandate that all future national security spacecraft incorporate targeted space weather 
sensors for the purposes of characterizing the local environment. The targeted space 
weather sensor data would not only help in adjudicating possible threats for each 
individual spacecraft but also lead to a better understanding of orbital regimes that 
ultimately lead to better space weather models and lower spacecraft cost. 
A. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Responses to both the primary research questions and the secondary research 
questions are presented as follows. The benefits of integrating targeted space weather 
sensors on all national security spacecraft are the focus of the primary research questions, 
while the secondary research questions present a general understanding of space weather 
and its effects on national security spacecraft. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
The primary research questions of this thesis address the benefits of integrating 
targeted space weather sensors on all national security spacecraft. These benefits are 
realized immediately by the spacecraft operators, as well as by space weather forecasters 
and space weather model developers after the amalgamation of this space weather sensor 
data is compiled and analyzed over time. The primary research questions also address the 
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technical and acquisition challenges of incorporating these sensors on all national 
security spacecraft, as well as how the community can overcome these challenges. 
 What Are the Expected Benefits of Increased Space Weather Situational 
Awareness Local to the Spacecraft? 
As discussed in Chapter V, the immediate and direct benefit of targeted space 
weather sensors is to assist operators with the rapid adjudication of on-orbit anomalies, 
reduce uncertainty, and allow corrective resources to be allocated appropriately to direct 
effects; be that space weather influenced or otherwise. Targeted space weather sensors 
would improve an operator’s ability to respond to on-orbit anomalies with an increased 
awareness of temporal and local radiation and vehicle charging conditions to support the 
operator by potentially eliminating space weather effects as a contributing factor to the 
anomalous event. Additionally, while the space domain continues to develop increasingly 
into a contested environment where the potential for adversarial impacts to national 
security spacecraft are substantially increasing, an awareness of local spacecraft 
environments can help operators assess and respond to anomalous conditions. 
In addition to the immediate improvement to anomaly resolution, the information 
provided by targeted space weather sensors can “directly provide data for new 
specification models, which, in turn reduce cost and risk on future missions” (Mazur et 
al. 2010, 17). This data can be used to increase the accuracy of space weather models 
used during the development of spacecraft systems. Ultimately, the amount of protection 
for spacecraft charging and single event upset designed into these systems could be 
reduced, allowing spacecraft designers to decrease the amount of component level and 
subsystem level testing. This decrease would directly contribute to reduced total system 
integration costs. 
 If the National Space Community Desires Those Benefits, What Are the 
Dimensions of an Acquisitions Strategy, Both Programmatic and 
Technical, That Must be Addressed? 
Covered in Chapter V, it is perceived that integration of these sensors would 
impact individual programs cost and schedule. For this reason, it is unlikely that any 
individual SPO would incorporate low impact space weather sensors on its vehicles 
unless a higher-level requirement was driven from the Space and Missile Systems Center 
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of Air Force Space Command or from the leadership at the NRO. If the national security 
space community decided that the benefits of targeted space weather sensors were 
desirable, then a policy directive would be required for all spacecraft to incorporate these 
sensors, and it would be expected for each SPO to submit waivers required to justify their 
exclusion.  
A comparable precedent for this kind of policy directive exists. In the mid-2000s, 
the DOD directed all national security spacecraft to incorporate GPS receivers to improve 
space situational awareness during launch and spacecraft operations. Program offices 
whose spacecraft did not have this capability incorporated into their baseline 
requirements had to request waivers to this requirement or make changes to the system 
that had cost or schedule impacts. Those systems early in their design life could 
incorporate those new GPS sensors with little to no impact to the programs cost or 
schedule. This approach is similar to that recommended by this thesis. 
If the national security space community determines that the benefits of 
integrating targeted space weather sensors on all national security space systems 
outweighs the minor impacts, then the leadership within the DOD and intelligence 
community (IC) must direct those requirement updates in the same way they directed 
GPS receiver integration. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Answering these secondary research questions allows the reader to have a general 
understanding of space weather, its effects on national security spacecraft, and to 
appreciate how incorporating inexpensive low-cost space weather sensors on all national 
security space systems would benefit both the immediate operators of that system and the 
entire enterprise at large. 
 What Is Space Weather and How Does It Affect Space Systems? 
For near Earth operating satellites, where those supporting the national security 
space enterprise reside, the space environment is primarily impacted by the interaction 
between the Earth’s geomagnetic field and the Sun. Chapter III went into detail on where 
national security space systems operate and how the interaction between the Sun and the 
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Earth’s magnetic field manipulates the space environment in those regions and how that 
environment can ultimately affect the spacecraft. 
 What Are the Current Operational Space Weather Monitoring 
Capabilities? 
Chapter IV discusses DOD and NOAA operational architectures of both on-orbit 
and ground-based space weather sensors and the space weather operation centers that 
consolidate gathered space weather information to provide an understanding of current 
space weather conditions, as well as attempt to forecast space weather events and issue 
alerts, watches, and warnings to stakeholders.  
For the DOD, the responsibility for monitoring and communicating current and 
expected space weather conditions falls to the 2nd Weather Squadron, under the 2nd 
Weather Group, part of the 557th Weather Wing stationed at Offutt Air Force Base, the 
home of U.S. Strategic Air Command. The Air Force maintains its own set of 
comprehensive space weather sensors, and some targeted, to provide national security 
stakeholders with relevant space weather data. 
The SWPC, part of NOAA under the DOC, based in Boulder, Colorado, is the 
civilian hub for space weather data collection, product development, and information 
dissemination. The SWPC teams with the U.S. Air Force to provide current 
comprehensive space weather conditions and forecasts. 
 What Technology Exists Today or in the Near Future That Could Provide 
Real-time Local Space Environment Data for Individual Spacecraft? 
Two types of low impact space environment sensors exist today that meet the 
low-impact definition presented in this thesis and are ready for integration onto today’s 
national security space systems. Multiple vendors, with the support from DOD and the 
IC, can provide these sensors as COTS parts ready for immediate integration. This thesis 
discusses individual sensors that have been introduced to monitor both the plasma and 
spacecraft charging potential environment, and the radiation environments. 
 How Can Localized Sensors Contribute to a Comprehensive 
Understanding of Space Weather Conditions and Forecasting? 
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Targeted space weather sensors primarily benefit localized space weather 
situational awareness around the host vehicle. They assist in space vehicle anomaly 
resolution and potential adjudication of adversarial threats. If all national security 
spacecraft incorporate these inexpensive and low-cost space weather sensors, the 
community has an opportunity to use this proliferated data set to improve space weather 
models, assisting both space weather forecasting and establishing engineering thresholds 
for spacecraft design. These incorporated sensors will allow for an unprecedented 
availability of observed space weather data from multiple orbits, considerably improving 
the understanding of space weather and actual space environment effects. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Space vehicle design, development, manufacturing, integration, and testing can 
take many years. It is recommended in this paper for the national security space 
enterprise to establish a requirement for all national security space systems to integrate 
inexpensive and low-impact space weather sensors. These sensors could significantly 
contribute to the health, safety, and operational availability of each individual satellite, as 
well as build a more comprehensive understanding of the space environment in all 
national security space areas of operation. Today, the national security space enterprise 
can no longer view space as an uncontested operational environment. The space 
environment is a relatively new domain of warfare that requires significant investment to 
ensure the United States maintains domain superiority in this region. The very low-
impact sensors and low-risk integration plan supported in this thesis should allow the 
SPO to incorporate these sensors with little cost or schedule impact to current and future 
space vehicles.  
It has become apparent through this research that national security space systems 
would benefit from an investment in commercially hosted sensors, as well as developing 
a standard interface on all national security space satellites for integration of secondary 
low-impact sensors. The same low-impact sensors introduced in this thesis could be 
integrated into commercial spacecraft that operate in similar orbital regimes as U.S. 
national security spacecraft. As discussed earlier, space weather and its environmental 
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effects can be local and independent to each spacecraft; however, commercially hosted 
sensors may help bridge a gap between comprehensive sensors and targeted sensors. 
These sensors would contribute to aggregated targeted and comprehensive space weather 
data to improve space weather models, and ultimately, spacecraft design and space 
weather forecasting to assist in protecting current on-orbit systems. The Appendix 
provided in this thesis discusses the approach taken by the Iridium satellite commercial 
communications company that developed satellite systems where low-impact sensors 
could be incorporated with a simple SWAP analysis. U.S. national security spacecraft 
could benefit from implementing a common standard for low-impact auxiliary payload 
integration. This approach has the potential not only for building a more resilient and 
responsive space weather architecture but also can be utilized for multiple space 
missions, such as communications and remote sensing.  
In addition to both nationally and commercially hosted sensors, the community 
may consider investing in space weather sensors hosted on small cube satellites, or “cube 
sats.” These satellites are very small compared to most national security satellites and 
have relatively little resource requirements compared to traditional spacecraft. These 
cube satellites can also be launched relatively cheaply, several at a time, along with a 
larger primary payload. Space weather sensors could be integrated into these small 
satellites and placed in proximity to national security satellites to provide the local 
targeted space weather data for those satellites currently in operations, as well as an 
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APPENDIX. RESPONSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
COMMERCIALLY HOSTED DEMONSTRATION TALKING 
PAPER 
This appendix discusses the approach taken by the Iridium satellite commercial 
communications company that developed satellite systems where low-impact sensors 
could be incorporated with a simple SWAP analysis (Space and Missile Systems Center 
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